

## **Building a Global Police Studies Community**

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# BUILDING A GLOBAL POLICE STUDIES COMMUNITY

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*Policing has become decentered from the state as substate and transnational developments have shifted some of the roles and authority for policing to new social and international groups and agencies. At the international level, a number of regime communities (e.g., scholars, nongovernmental organizations, police leaders, transnational policy makers, and policy think tanks) have actively promoted the emergence of a democratic, international policing regime and its adoption by states and police forces in transitional, failed, and developed countries. Recent developments are described, and their implications for the practices and the study of policing are assessed.*

**Keywords:** *transnational policing; international policing regimes; regime communities; democratic policing; security sector reform*

Studying the police allows and, indeed, mandates that students of policing use multiple levels of analyses and different approaches, theoretical frameworks, methodologies, and interpretations without being constrained by academic disciplinary boundaries and orthodoxies. And policing is worth paying attention to. It is one of the most important activities done by the state and society in any era or setting. Thinking through what policing is for requires a complex, multilevel, multidisciplinary analysis of the conditions that have led to various conceptions and practices of policing, their institutional and symbolic representations, and their societal consequences. For

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example, examinations of police reform efforts in transitional countries have to examine changes in policing but also in “constitutional law, human rights protections, civil service regulations, postcommunist transition processes, political culture, and the criminal justice system, especially access to justice issues for minorities and the poor” (M. Caparini, personal communication, February 26, 2004), and one could add the workings of the criminal justice system or the hegemonic justice notions governing discussions of reforms and judgments of progress.

This article will touch on three issues:

1. What are the interesting developments taking place in policing, and why are they occurring now?
2. How have such developments been conceptualized?
3. I will suggest, based on the analysis of international policing developments, security sector reform (SSR) as a theoretically fruitful approach that can complement other currently fashionable conceptualizations that seek to understand ongoing innovations in policing.

I will sketch some basic themes and issues to argue that current interpretations of changes in the roles and functions of the police still tend to simplify, hence misrepresent, the political roles of the police. The political elements of developments in the new policing space (outlined below) have been insufficiently theorized. More precisely, developments in policing suggest that the conventional, Weberian conception that policing represents the state’s exercise of its legitimate monopoly of coercion cannot be sustained (e.g., Johnston, 1998, p. 196; Manning, 2000, p. 177). I will elaborate on this argument by sketching changes in policing at the transnational/international level, specifically the emergence of an international democratic policing regime and the growth of a network of transnational regime communities that have shaped the ideas and values embodied in that regime.

Developments in transnational and international policing can serve as a useful arena in which to examine the political dynamics of policing in such areas as reforms of policing systems, the relations of the police to state and civic society, and the effects of policing on the enhancement of security, processes of democratization, and the legitimation of new political and security structures. Security sector reform, which has gained some prominence in the thinking and writing of private and governmental reform and policy communities, captures, more powerfully than do other conceptualizations, the importance and effects of policing on its settings and the capacity of the police for autonomous action.

This article will not attempt a comprehensive or detailed summation of changes in policing and the conceptualizations that seek to make sense of what has been happening. That is much too big a task. Instead, I will focus on changes in transnational policing to argue that a global community that studies policing already exists but has not yet been sufficiently acknowledged by practitioners of police studies.<sup>1</sup> Much of the information for this article comes from formal and informal interactions in a variety of fora with actors involved in transnational policing, Web site searches, published and unpublished documents, and the standard literatures.

### POLICING DEVELOPMENTS

It has become conventional wisdom that policing is changing in all countries and transnationally. Notions such as pluralization (Bayley & Shearing, 1996), multilateralization (Bayley & Shearing, 2001, p. vii), the expansion of policing space territorially and into cyberspace (Manning, 2000), becoming “fractured, embedded and decentered” (Shearing, 1996, p. 286), or the emergence of transnational and international policing regimes point to similar phenomena. Following a suggestion by Bill Heberton (personal communication, May 12, 2003), the policing space has been broadened, stretched, and deepened.

Policing space has been broadened by a practical rethinking and retooling of the roles of the police and their effect on society. The reach and domain of policing now is seen as extending far beyond a minimal conception of policing as law enforcement, crime control, the provision of ordering services, or the collection of intelligence by many means. Some of this expansion has been captured under the community policing rubric, but changes far transcend such minimalist redefinitions of the jobs of policing. What the police do, and what they should do, has practical and symbolic implications for the formation of identity groups and politics, the reproduction of social order and state-society linkages, the transformation of authoritarian political systems into democratic forms of governance and social life, and the recreation of systems of governments that have collapsed or have been overturned. Effective and fair policing is one of the foundations of political order, not only its product. Indeed, it can be argued that democratic policing is a precondition for attaining a democratic political system.<sup>2</sup>

Policing space has been stretched to include the range of formal and informal organizations and practices that enhance the reality and perception of security for individuals, civic society, and the state. At one end of the

continuum, policing can resemble society- or state-sponsored or state-tolerated vigilante actions and communitarian self-help. At the other end, policing forces now are incorporated, largely by the force of transnational developments (e.g., organized crime, terrorism, illegal movements of people), into the ideologies and practices of other state-security providing organizations such as the military, border guards, or intelligence sectors (Anderson, 2000; Bigo, 2000; Garcia, 2002; Kraska, 2001).<sup>3</sup> Along the continuum exist forms of private and commercial security arrangements for those who can afford to pay for them (Findlay & Zvekcic, 1993; Johnston, 1992; Shearing, 1992). At both domestic and international levels, private companies now perform work that talks, walks, and quacks like the police but lacks the visible imprimatur of the state. For example, the United States has outsourced the recruitment, training, deployment, and discipline of U.S. Civilian Police (CIVPOL) contingents in UN peacekeeping operations to private contractors.

Policing space has been deepened by the loosening of an intrinsic and theoretically powerful linking of the state and instruments of coercion claimed as a legitimate monopoly by the state. For a number of developments and reasons (most tied to the forces and effects of economic globalization on states and local communities)—the decline of the state as an effective provider of security (Garland, 1996), the rise of democratic ideologies on how to judge state performance, the calculations of societal risk by aggregate traits and generalized fears, and the promotion of alternative practices and conceptions of the governance of security—control and the exercise of policing have expanded above and below the Westphalian state. Policing is done below the state by private, commercial, and communitarian practices and above the state by international and transnational linkages among states, police organizations, professional associations, and civic groups through a variety of institutionalized mechanisms and policies and by police forces such as the EU Fisheries Police that are not anchored in any state (see Deflem, 2003; Fijnaut, 1993; Heberton & Thomas, 1995; MacDonald, 1997).

The symbolic representation of these changes, the dramaturgy (to use Peter Manning's, 1998b, phrase) of policing, has changed to keep subjective pace with objective developments. The police, scholars, policy makers, and international regime communities have devised symbolic representations that both explain and justify the need, and the justice, of what has been happening. Symbolism matters to policing because policing is a form of

social ordering that seeks to promote, objectively, conditions of safety and, subjectively, perceptions that justice is being done.<sup>4</sup>

The expansion of policing space (and alternative conceptions of policing that seek to understand these developments) complicates traditional problems in democratic policing. For example, control of policing has become more tenuous as policing expands into nontraditional, grey areas (Hoogenboom, 1991) and is done by numerous groups on the basis of different mentalities (Bayley & Shearing, 2001, pp. 17-19) and as new forms of social contracting in so-called bubbles or nodes of governance (Shearing & Wood, 2000) become more and more frequent. Accountability, and the essential transparency required to allow effective oversight, is weakened as policing expands into secret lairs and informal ways and becomes located outside and across the sovereign jurisdictions of the state system in regional and international bodies that are opaque in their decision-making patterns (Huggins, 2000; McLaughlin, 1992; Sarre, 2000; <http://www.statewatch.org>). The legitimacy of new forms and manners of policing is suspect and unknown by the population who experience its power mainly at a distance. In short, plural, multilateral, multilayered policing is not easily susceptible to the control, accountability, and legitimating mechanisms that suited a state-centered police (Loader, 2000). New forms and means of control have to be invented and incorporated into emerging democratic policing regimes, and this is no more true than at the international/transnational level.

### MAKING SENSE OF POLICING DEVELOPMENTS

Common pathways to understanding recent policing developments employ standard social science terminology and technique but with a nod to the practical impossibilities of doing research and analysis in the most proper way given the nature of the subject matter, its historical dimensions, and the lack of accurate data. Bayley's (1985) historically based categorization and search for correlations in the development of the characteristics of modern police forces takes this tack as does Garland's (2001) more comprehensive look at patterns of social control in the postmodern era. More recently, Bayley and Shearing (2001) summarized much of the ongoing developments and suggested and arranged likely reasons for the trend toward a larger policing space into broad categories. Such explanations and theorizing place policing changes into the wider realm of social and political changes of the modern era and, in that sense, what is happening in

policing is a reflection of, and to some degree affects, wider societal and global changes.

Another popular interpretation links two societal trends to policing: (a) the concept of a risk society that seeks accurate intelligence to identify, prioritize, label, and seek to prevent a number of risks to society and the state that arise normally in the course of historical developments (Ericson, 1994) and (b) the increasing importance of technology for the processing and transformation of information into useable intelligence, a process that imposes on intelligence-centered organizations organizational and policy constraints tied to the nature of the technology employed (Chan, 2001; Manning, 1998a, 2001). Policing becomes the assessment of risk and the imposition of control on conditions, individuals, and groups that are seen as posing substantial, verifiable risks. High policing (Brodeur, 1983) and the manipulation of information is the hallmark of policing in a risk society (Mawby, 2002). Policing space has expanded because the risk and the need for intelligence have grown, almost exponentially, domestically and certainly globally. The promotion of security rather than domestic, moral, missionary work has become the driving goal of the police (Loader, 2002). The declining capacity of the modern state further encourages self-help social control and encourages the co-optation or incorporation of civic society into the control apparatuses of the state. The drive in the United States toward homeland security as the dominant national obligation and objective represents a big step toward the ultimate embodiment of risk-based and security-conscious policing that is a police state.

A more theoretically interesting argument locates policing in governance—in the changing political, cultural, and economic dynamics of the postmodern age (Shearing, 1996). In a vaguely Marxist throwback to notions of reification, this interpretation argues that changes in global economic, technological, and political conditions favor and have led to the commodification of security and the intelligence needed for effective risk prevention and control as merely another service traded in the domestic and international markets.<sup>5</sup> Rather than being the monopoly of the state, coercive and persuasive powers have been delegated to or grabbed by those who can afford the exercise of social control (from gated communities, shopping malls, entertainment centers, or housing developments) and have the skills and resources to create alliances and networks in which they “seek to manage each other in an attempt to produce effects they regard as desirable” (Shearing, 1996, p. 287), in this case security. The poor and underresourced are left at the mercies of an ineffective and often nonlegitimate state policing system or

forced into self-help activities of questionable legality and effectiveness. Security, in the form of policing ideas, techniques, and equipment, is traded as would be any other commodity.

This process can be observed in Western democracies in which it is most advanced but also in the proliferation of privatized security in most developing countries and in shifts in policing ideologies and practices in transitional states (e.g., Dutton, 2000; Los & Zybertowicz, 2001). Anyone who has visited or lived in large urban conglomerations of the third world cannot but have noticed the vast array of private protection measures employed by citizens and commercial enterprises (armed guards outside banks and stores, physical security devices) because the state has failed or been corrupted.

Existing interpretations capture parts of the meaning of an expanding policing space, but they do not place the politics of policing at center stage. The notion that policing is an, if not the, essential political activity, that it is part and parcel of political life and state-civic society interactions and has a strong symbolic component is not all that surprising. The crucial flash-points of policing as politics (or the politics of policing), and the best expression of the democratic or authoritarian nature of that politics,<sup>6</sup> can be observed in the treatment of individuals in encounters in the policing of mass protests and large gatherings (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998; Waddington, 1993, 1994, 2001) and in the uses of intelligence (undercover collection, secret invasions of private spaces, or social control based on intelligence estimations rather than provable facts), conditions in which coercive power is more concentrated and less visible.

A theoretical and policy perspective that focuses directly on the political nature of policing is SSR. The provision of security for citizens is a political issue par excellence. An inefficient, corrupt, or repressive security sector will undermine all efforts to promote economic and political development, including the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and political accountability—all crucial elements in a democratic society.

## GAPS AND AGENDAS

There are empirical gaps in police studies that weaken the capacity to develop a well-grounded comparative theory. One gap is global coverage, largely the result of noncommunication across languages. In fact, police studies are most commonly done by Western or Western-trained scholars, with little reference to perspectives and understandings that reflect other

cultures and traditions. Yet even in Western studies, much of the research that does exist is not easily shared because, in practice, communication among scholars of policing developments is in English. Research done, and there is a substantial amount, will remain unknown to English-speaking audiences unless the researchers publish their findings and arguments in English.<sup>7</sup> There exist extensive literatures on the sociology, management, and politics of policing in other European languages, both for European societies but for formerly colonized states as well. But, that research is not well-known outside their spheres of language competence. For example, there exists a substantial literature on the policing systems of Brazil, but unless one knows Portuguese it is largely nonavailable.

A related gap is the absence of knowledge on the police in most transitional and developing countries. Police studies basically mean knowing something about Western (English-speaking) democracies. For example, knowledge of the policing systems (their structures, dynamics, policies, practices, cultures) of Nigeria, a country of about 130 million people aspiring to democracy, is basically nonexistent, and there is really no research on the effectiveness of policing for crime and order or any other socially important goal. In substantive terms, much of police studies and the knowledge accumulated in Western democracies on how police are organized and managed, how they behave and think, and the consequences of their actions have not been duplicated outside the Western sphere (the exception may be India). There exists very little research on the dynamics of discretion, for example, or the cultures of policing, the interactions of formal and informal ordering systems, the managerial tactics and strategies of police administrators, or assessments of effectiveness of innovations and programs.

The result of noncommunication is a loss of information and theorizing, redundancy and overlap in research and interpretations, and theoretical pauperization. The biggest gap, though, is in theorizing about the roles of the police in their social settings.<sup>8</sup> The exception is studies of transnational policing that, necessarily, have to focus on political questions because relations cross sovereign boundaries (the ultimate political symbol) and because efforts to export policing and reform policing systems touch on the core notion of that sovereignty, the monopoly of coercion by the state. Reforming policing, whether through internal political processes or external pressures and enticements, changes the distribution of powers and privileges in any state and casts into clear relief the political consequences of the normal practices of the police.

### TRANSNATIONAL POLICING REGIMES, THE LESSONS OF REFORM, AND REGIME COMMUNITIES

Conventionally, the study of international policing has meant either describing and analyzing Interpol, Europol, and other transnational, police-related institutions that have arisen in the context of regional political projects (e.g., Anderson, 1989, 1997; Koenig & Das, 2001) or the description of transnational cooperation among police forces in their struggle against international crime in all its forms. Yet numerous other transnational developments have flown under the radar screen of police studies. International policing is much more complex in its processes, linkages, and effects than the study of international policing institutions or cooperation in global crime control even hints at. One such development is the emergence of a transnational policing regime, the main carrier of notions of so-called good policing or, more specifically, democratic policing and its propagation across the globe through example, persuasion, or imposition. Regimes embody the norms that define *democratic*, the practices that must be done or avoided to implement norms and the policies that will work to change policing systems toward preferred regime norms.

Regimes are suggested, advocated, created, sustained, and evaluated by numerous players, actors, and regime communities, often networked in policy communities or regional arenas. Regimes are tied together by individual *shuttlers* who pass through and live in different regime communities during their careers on the international scene. Core values and principles of democratic policing that transnational advice, assistance, and aid seeks to promote, as well as lessons learned from the experience of reform, reflect the ideational work and policy advocacy of groups or communities of reformers, scholars, police leaders, policy advocates, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Examining the recent emergence of a regime in transnational and international policing provides some theoretical hints on the political roles and dynamics of policing. Regimes suggest what so-called good practices (however defined for the specific activity) consist of. International regimes also suggest that countries that do not meet the norms and practices embodied in regimes need to change their ways. Research on the transnational promotion of so-called good policing has examined such questions as how will police forces incorporate international and regional conventions that will constrain their powers and practices; how can policing systems be created in transitional and failed states and by what means and processes; can

policing systems be created, or stood up and sustained, by the transference of nonlocal models; what are the appropriate roles and functions of the police in a democratic society; what role does policing or, more broadly, the governance of security play in the processes of political legitimation; and, most broadly conceived, what are the effects of policing systems on the reproduction of the state and society and on processes of development and democratization?

This much can be said with some assurance at this time:

1. Transnational policing regimes have emerged. There is a general agreement on the substance and practices that democratic policing should embody.
2. There is some agreement on what issues must be addressed and what processes are required for implementing or creating democratic police forces in settings in which they did not exist.
3. There is some theorizing about why and how policing matters for political change. Most of these generalizations are based on skilled inferences drawn from their experiences by practitioners, policy makers, and scholars or, more exceptionally, drawn from more theoretical perspectives on the roles of the police in processes of political development and democratization (e.g., Hills, 2000).

### TRANSNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC POLICING REGIMES

International policing regimes have become a reality. A general consensus on the basic principles for democratic policing has emerged. As Bayley (2001) noted, "the elements of democratic police reform are no longer problematic" (p. 76). Some principles can be found in academic discussions of democratic policing; some are stated as universal codes of conduct for police officers anywhere (e.g., Council of Europe code of ethics, UN codes on police conduct and the use of force, CIVPOL operational standards, or Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE] guidelines); some are found as recommendations by reform commissions (e.g., Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, 1999); some are elaborated in policy documents produced by NGOs or government agencies (e.g., "Budapest Recommendations" in Kádár, 2001); some appear, almost incidentally, in more general discussions of democracy and democratization.

The basic terms and phrases used overlap. Authors, international codes, and policy recommendations differ mainly in their phrasing of norms, their ranking of desirable or necessary traits, and the implied priorities among principles. Commonly mentioned requirements for democratic policing that point to more specific, desirable traits include nonpartisanship;

representativeness in the composition of personnel; integrity; fairness; accountability; transparency; sensitivity; moral consensus; civilian control; a public service orientation; obedience or commitment to the rule of law; concern for human rights; responsiveness to civic society; impartiality; minimal, last-resort use of force; accessibility; separation from military forces and cultures; and general order (e.g., Amir & Einstein, 2001; Bayley, 1995, 1999, 2001; Council of Europe, 2000; Das & Marenin, 2000; Das & Palmiotto, 2002; Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, 1999; Jones, Newburn, & Smith, 1996; Law Commission of Canada, 2002; Marenin, 1998a; Neild, 2002; O'Rawe & Moore, 1997; OSCE, 2002; Sheptycki, 1996, 2000; United Nations, 1994, 1997, 2000; United Nations, 1996; U.S. Congress, 1996; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1992, 1993, 1994; Walker, 1993).

These commonly mentioned requirements suggest three basic conditions for democratic policing: professionalism, accountability, and legitimation. For example, nonpartisanship, moral consensus, responsiveness to society, and representativeness of personnel are basic factors in sustaining legitimacy (Reiner, 1992). A partisan police that favors and is seen to favor particular social and political groups, especially if numerically small, or mainly serves the state will have little legitimacy in the eyes of the general public and will receive little support and cooperation from the public. Moral consensus points to the notion that what the police stand for—the laws they enforce and their manner of enforcing them—must be in some accord with widely held societal values. Responsiveness to society reflects the demand that the police listen to and take into account what society wants them to do while taking into account the interests of nonmajorities. A nonrepresentative force, especially in divided societies, will always be suspect no matter how effective and professional its actions.

Professionalism refers to particular values, skills, occupational orientations, and policies of a police service. The principles of fairness, integrity, sensitivity, concern for human rights, commitment to service, impartiality, commitment to law, and the use of minimal force are core elements in any conception of professional (and democratic) policing.

Accountability encompasses the notions of transparency, democratic and civilian oversight and control, and separation from the military (although this last assertion can be contested). Transparency is an essential foundation for accountability. If one cannot tell what the police are doing one cannot hold them accountable (Goldsmith & Lewis, 2000; Kádár, 2001; Loveday, 1999; Perez, 2000; Stone & Ward, 2000).

Regime norms circle around the notion of protecting human rights (while also providing effective security) as the fundamental, core responsibility of democratic policing systems (Neyroud & Beckley, 2001), hence, the focus is heavily on professional and ethical norms and codes of conduct and how such norms can be implanted in the cultural beliefs and working habits of police officers. In transnational assistance programs, and in terms of models, democratic norms have tended to be translated as community-oriented policing (COP; e.g., Friedman, 1992; Lab & Das, 2003; Skolnick & Bayley, 1988), although there are some dissenters who claim that COP is not the model to emulate or that it can be emulated within different contexts (e.g., Brogden, 1999; Habersfeld, 1997; Wong, 2001) or that the intent of transnational assistance is the creation of democratic forces (Huggins, 1998). The other substantive foci in transnational assistance programs that are not necessarily enshrined in regime norms are managerial strategies and tactics and crime control techniques of various sorts (e.g., undercover operations, forensics, and data manipulation). These tend to be seen as nonpolitical, universal requirements for administering a large organization effectively and efficiently and producing an effect on crime.

#### LESSONS FOR ESTABLISHING DEMOCRATIC POLICING SYSTEMS

In short, defining what democratic policing should be like in its occupational cultures, operational policies, and relations to state and society is not particularly problematic anymore. A basic agreement on general principles and values has been achieved. The real difficulty now is how to implement democratic policing—to translate regime notions into policy and practice—and, specifically, what needs to be done in creating and sustaining organizational arrangements, managerial strategies, personnel policies, training and education, operational supervision, internal control and accountability mechanisms, and effective interactions with outsiders (public, media, scholarship, political agencies). Some themes, and an emergent consensus, in discussions of the process needed to move toward democratic police systems and forces stand out. (The discussion of reform processes below follows Caparini & Marenin, 2002; but see also Bayley, 2001; Heyman, 1992; Mani, 1999; McHugh, 1994; Neild, 2001, 2002; Oakley & Dziedzic, 1998; Stepan & Costa, 2001.)

The most important theme is that any effort to democratize policing systems requires a profound understanding of the practices, cultures, and

politics of policing; the politics of the locale; and the interests of domestic and international reformers seeking change. For example, practically all recommendations by Bayley (2001) on "Generic Lessons for Reforming Police Organizations" (pp. 19-31) fit under this theme and support this point. Other subsidiary themes can be summarized.

Principles, not policies, matter. There is no one organizational model of democratic policing that can be bought off the shelf or imported into other settings. Principles can be stated, lessons can be learned, and best practices can be described. However, these are always solutions developed in different societal settings, and whether they are appropriate to the conditions of change experienced in a society has to be assessed, mainly, by the people who will have to live with the reformed policing systems. Karstedt (2001, 2002) argued that, at best, successful examples can serve as models that must be adapted to the experiences and functional and symbolic conditions of a society. Assistance and advice must be crafted "so that it not only draws on relevant models, but also adapts itself to the local realities and builds upon positive policing and justice traditions" (Call, 2003, p. 5).

Reforms will be sustained only when existing features that militate against reform are neutralized or eliminated. There are no blank slates on which police reform can be inscribed. Adaptation of democratic principles to local conditions requires decisions both on what to do away with (or what will disrupt or oppose efforts at reform) and what to put in place that is new, whether these are personnel, occupational orientations, legal policies, or structures. Much of adaptation has to be left to the imagination and energy of major stakeholders in reforms; the political leadership; civic society, generally understood; and also the police themselves. International advice on lessons and practices can only serve as a resource, not as the vehicle for reform. The need for local adaptation (and the corresponding limits on external advice and assistance) is much greater for ideological and strategic rethinking and less so for the incorporation of technical skills into the policing systems being reformed.

Understanding leverage will be needed to overcome the inevitable resistance to police reform. Implementing reforms is not a self-executing process. Disarming potential opponents to reform, including the police, is essential, and that requires an acute awareness of the social and political consequences of reform that will extend beyond the police themselves.

Reforms often occur in a climate where crime and fear are prevalent and growing. There will be a tendency, and this is often the major reason for international assistance, to make the police more capable of dealing with

crime, especially organized crime. Concern for justice will, of necessity, have to be relegated to the background on a temporary basis (so it is said). Yet reforms have inertia once they become institutionalized and part of the occupational and managerial policies and culture of the police. Justice matters, but if relegated to a second-level priority, even though only temporarily, will remain relegated. The necessary democratic balance will be permanently tilted toward effectiveness. In the short run, effectiveness may lead to feelings of legitimacy in the general population. In the long run, effectiveness by itself is not persuasive enough to sustain legitimacy.

The notion that effectiveness and justice are locked in a zero-sum game, that placing priority on one will lead to a loss in the other value, is increasingly challenged by scholars, reformers, and the police. As Neild (2001; also Bayley, 2002) noted, “respectful policing is effective policing. A respect for human rights does not hamstring the criminal justice system, but is vital to public order and law enforcement” (p. 34). Police practices that lack a justice element will increasingly isolate the police from its society, forcing it to fall back on coercion and fear to do its work. The public will not willingly cooperate with a force it fears and disrespects.

The police cannot perform their job in isolation or without support from other control institutions. Effectiveness and justice require that reforms are of the criminal justice systems as a whole. Legal reforms, prosecuting offices that make efficient and fair decisions, courts that function, sanctioning policies of various sorts, and reintegration mechanisms need to support the police in their work (U.S. Institute of Peace, 2003). The police often object to the workings of other criminal justice institutions, especially courts, when judges and prosecutors insist that legal limitations on the power of the police be observed by the police in investigations, interrogations, arrests, and the use of force. Yet those are necessary and essential constraints within a system that abides by the rule of law and seeks to promote justice as well as safety.

In the end, reforms must show up on the street in the normal work of the police. Assessments of reforms must step beyond the rhetoric to observe what actually has changed where it counts: in the behavior of police leaders, midlevel managers, and street cops. For this to happen, reforms must make sense to the police who are asked to implement them within the realities of the work they do (e.g., Chan, 1997; Steytler, 1990). The views of the police themselves are an important issue in implementing reforms. The question of why personnel hired by the state to do a job would be willing to abide by reforms, accept new ways of looking at their occupational arenas, and learn

and apply new skills and attitudes for interacting with the people they serve is not an irrelevant one. A fundamental intermediary target of reforms, therefore, is the existing police culture, for without a democratized culture there will be nice plans, cogently designed policies, and soothing rhetorical flourishes but little action on the street. Western police studies could be useful here in suggesting foci of research and appropriate methodologies on how to investigate the working world of the police (e.g., Brodeur, 1998; Haberfeld, 2002; Haberfeld, Klockars, Kutjnak Ivkovich, & Pagon, 2000; or the conference proceedings edited by Pagon, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002). Policing must be transformed, not just modernized or made more professional. Such “transformation must involve holistic, inclusive and coherent processes capable of building human rights values and practices into the heart of policing arrangements” (O’Rawe, 2003, pp. 1069-1070).

A common development in transitional countries and failed states is the continuity or emergence of shadows—informal, non-state-based, social-order-producing or disrupting organizations of varying legitimacy that challenge the state’s monopoly of coercion such as community-based informal justice and vigilante-type processes; private security organizations hired by economic enterprises that also drain away a significant share of experienced police personnel; criminal groups that impose order to protect their activities in often brutal and exploitative ways but with some acceptance among the public for which they are the only, even if criminal, source of stability; and deposed leaders who call on their followers to resist policing and political changes. The police, the new state, and civic society will have to incorporate and/or transform legitimate shadows and undermine and destroy illegitimate ones. Shadows will not just go away.

Last, a long-term commitment of will and resources by the domestic political leadership, police managers, domestic and transnational civic groups, and the assisting international community is required.

## REGIME COMMUNITIES

The interesting question is how this near consensus on regimes and processes and lessons of reform has arisen. Who is doing this work? Who has been involved in the creation of regimes, and how does regime-creation work succeed? First of all, regimes are more than international rhetoric, hopes, and agreements. They embody understood notions of right and wrong and norms of professional and nonprofessional conduct that, although not law, are accepted as standards to assess goals and performance. Second,

regimes are not static and set; instead, they are continually reproduced in the processes of their implementation.

One can identify five different communities that have been extensively involved in the creation of democratic policing regimes. The five regime communities are scholars and researchers and their associated institutions; policy outfits and think tanks; domestic, international, and transnational policy makers (e.g., European Commission, OSCE, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program [ICITAP], etc.); private groups—NGOs and consultancy firms; and the police themselves through international professional associations (e.g., Association of European Police Colleges, Interpol, Europol, etc.), agency to agency interactions, and participation in bilateral assistance, training, crime control, and reform projects.

The distinctions among the communities are somewhat artificial. Personnel move around in their careers: Researchers become consultants, work for NGOs, or enter policy outfits; police become researchers and policy makers; and NGO personnel achieve consultant status with police and policy organizations. I would argue that the five regime communities, although initially antagonists, are coalescing into a free-floating, international civil service without a fixed home that is called on for advice on the content and implementation of reforms when the need arises. Regime communities may be viewed as the beginnings of a global civic society, a network of organizations that ultimately can function on the global level as interest groups for certain values and policies, thereby counterbalancing both the destabilizing effects of globalization and the vitality and potential abuse of state power. A similar pattern can be observed in other functional transnational sectors (e.g., agricultural reforms). Police and policy makers and implementers know whom to call when they need expert advice, and researchers and NGOs know whom to go to when they wish to study or advocate reforms.<sup>9</sup>

In short, the major reason why agreement among these five communities exists is the overlap of personnel among the communities (individuals shuttle in networks) and a consensus of sorts on changes in the policing practices and ideological justifications of the preferred model that underlies transnational regimes—the policing practiced in Western democracies (ideas are shuttled through networking). Shearing (1996), in reference to the emergence of privatized alongside state-centered policing, argued that the integration of new and old forms of policing occurs through “the adoption of similar discourses and strategies” (p. 294). The same argument applies to transnational regime communities. Reading the documents produced by members of regime communities, one cannot help but be struck by

the commonality of the language used. One could take whole sections from one document and place these into others without much difficulty or loss of comprehension.

Some examples of regime communities and actors are given below. These are illustrative of a much greater number of individuals, agencies, civic groups, states, and transnational organizations involved in shaping the policing systems of all states toward a more democratic bend.

*Scholars and research institutions.* Much of the knowledge on international policing practices, including the formation of regimes and their contents, comes from academics and researchers through original research or the summation and synthesis of available knowledge. This regime community is probably the best known among observers of police studies.

Research drifts into policy recommendations and actions in a natural way. Compared to most pure academics, scholars interested in studying the police tend to be more interested in the policy implications of their work and are willing to spell out what these are (e.g., John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 1996; scholars at the North-South Center at the University of Miami [e.g., Gamarra, 1996]; or the work done at the Scarman Centre at Leicester University and other universities such as the Erasmus Centre for Police Studies at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, or the Centre for Police Research at Edith Cowan University in Joondalup, Australia). Individual academics participate in reform advocacy in a variety of ways: as consultants, researchers who argue recommendations (e.g., Brogden & Shearing, 1993), or as participants in investigative and reform commissions (e.g., the Patten Commission for Northern Ireland or the Goldstone Commission in South Africa).

*Policy outfits and think tanks.* A large number of prominent transnational policy institutions and think tanks deal with policing issues. Although I mention mainly European policy shops, it would be easy to add institutions from all regions of the world. Quite often, policy centers focus on a large variety of security and developmental issues. Research and advocacy related to policing are not always obvious from the formal titles of the institutions. Although mostly interested in the collection and analysis of information on the status of policing and security developments, there is an unavoidable advocacy component to their work.

Mention should be made of the Center for European Policy Studies (e.g., Anderson, Apap, & Mulkins, 2001; Center for European Policy Studies,

2001; Huisman, 2002); the European Institute of Public Administration in Maastricht (e.g., den Boer, 1999); the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (e.g., Papsworth & Wihata, 2001); the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control in Helsinki; the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (e.g., Larsen, 2002; Lia, 2002); the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, which conducts activities worldwide (e.g., Schlicht, 1998); the Center for International Studies and Research in Paris (e.g., Jobard, 2000); the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (2001); the Max Planck Institute in Freiburg, Germany; the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, mainly through its Adelphi Paper series; the Institute for Public Policy Research (e.g., Walker, 1993); the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Security Sector Reform Program of the National Democratic Institute, both in Washington, D.C.; the Ford Foundation's Police and Democratic Society Program; the Helsinki Foundation (e.g., Kádár, 2001); the Committee for the Administration of Justice in Belfast (e.g., O'Rawe & Moore, 1997); the Vera Institute of Justice (2000) in New York; the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Johannesburg, South Africa; the Center for Development Studies, Santiago, Chile; the African Security Dialogue and Research, Accra, Ghana; and the Institute of Governance and Social Research, Jos, Nigeria.

This is a growth industry.

*Transnational policy makers.* Policy makers occupy positions in domestic and international organizations that promote and oversee policing reform projects. Again, this could be a long list. Examples are the UN-based International Peace Academy (e.g., Call, 2003); the European Commission's Third Pillar sections (e.g., Hobbing, 2000); the Council of Europe; OSCE (2001, 2002); the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission section (e.g., Organization of American States, 1992, 1996); or national agencies such as ICITAP in the U.S. Department of Justice (e.g., Perito, 1998) or similar offices in other countries. In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights has made a large policy impact in those states that have ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (e.g., on British policing policies in Northern Ireland; O'Rawe, 2003, pp. 1067-1068).

Policy makers have a (profound?) effect on shaping policing systems across the globe through their capacity to define the normative, structural, and operational traits of democratic policing (they shape the discourse) and

through their ability to control the flow of resources in support of desirable changes.

*NGOs and consultancy firms.* There is a vibrant network of human rights and development-oriented NGOs that have an interest in the police and in police reforms with a focus on democratic performance or the lack thereof.

One can mention the Washington Office on Latin America, which has produced a number of significant police reform studies (Washington Office on Latin America, 1995, 1999-2000; Ziegler & Neild, 2002); Lawyers for Human Rights, who have offices across the world; Amnesty International, of course; Transparency International, which has begun an annual survey of police corruption across the world; the International Council on Human Rights Policy (2003); the Open Society Institute funded by George Soros; and the International Crisis Group (2002).

Private consultancy firms have proliferated. One example must stand for many. TC-Team Consult, located in Geneva, has conducted assessments of policing and management training in Hungary (Gottlieb, Krözsel, & Prestel, 1998) and in German Länder, guided a community policing project in Bosnia, been contracted to evaluate the EU police mission and police reforms in Bosnia, and is now engaged in assessing and advising on policing reforms in Mozambique and Kazakhstan. Consulting on the police is global in its reach.<sup>10</sup>

*Police.* The police are the most numerous transnational actors, yet their capacity to help shape transnational regimes (that is, the nature of their work and how it will be assessed) has been little appreciated (but see Bigo, 2000; Nadelmann, 1993, 1997). They are normally seen as executing, with some deviations, plans devised by others or as interested largely in transferring technical and managerial skills that enhance international crime control. Yet they possess the capacity to affect the reproduction of their institutions, policies, authority, and practices across the globe. As O’Rawe (2003) noted in the case of reforms of the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern Ireland, the police “have carved out a high degree of process ownership” (p. 1065) through numerous means that have allowed them to participate in the management of change. That has also happened on the international scene.

One basic mechanism is professional, international meetings and conferences that, as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (<http://www.theiacp.org>) noted, deal with special topics but also promote “net-

working, [the] exchange of ideas, capitalizing on lessons learned abroad, and further professional growth.” Conferences and workshops occur in vast numbers and are organized by international and regional institutions (Interpol, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations), international and national professional organizations of the police (e.g., the European Network of Police Women), and by think tanks, NGOs, or policy shops.

A second major mechanism to shape emerging regimes is transnational training programs, institutions, and projects. The Association of European Police Colleges has sought to harmonize and standardize training curricula among the police systems of EU candidate countries so they will incorporate common European policing practices and values (e.g., Association of European Police Colleges, 2002a, 2002b). The Mitteleuropäische Polizeiakademie (MEPA; founded by Austrian and Hungarian police officials but now grown to include eight countries) organizes traveling training courses that visit each member country during the course of training (<http://www.mepa.net>). The Nordic-Baltic Police Academy organizes common training for Baltic countries. U.S.–sponsored International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) in Budapest; Bangkok; Gabarone; and Roswell, New Mexico, promote American policing views for dealing with transnational crime problems, drug trafficking, and terrorist threats, with some classes focused on human rights concerns as well. Extensive training is also provided through programs at in-country academies or through sponsored international exchanges such as the Fulbright program for police.

Third, there is much exchange or visitations of personnel on an agency-to-agency basis. In the United States that means local police departments will visit foreign places and host foreign visitors just to show visitors around and show how hosts deal with particular problems. For example, the Metro Dade police sent police officers to Kazakhstan to advise on the implementation of shelters for battered women. In countries that have a more centralized policing system, exchanges are organized through central administrative organs but carried out by local forces. For example, the Dutch and Hungarian police have partnership agreements that match local forces. A similar system exists for Scottish forces who partner with Baltic state forces. The goal is familiarization with the policing practices of others and the exchange of policing norms appropriate for democratic systems.

A fourth mechanism is bilateral agreements among countries and their police forces. Although most often set up as mutual information sharing and cooperation agreements mainly focused on dealing with crimes that

cross borders, interactions in common works and tasks lead to the sharing of police knowledge, best practices, common understandings on the causes of crime, and what is needed to solve and control criminals—all reflecting the widely shared and often stated notion that we are all police and we talk the common language of the brotherhood (and sisterhood) of the police.

A fifth mechanism is police participation in think tanks and in policy-making offices. Police managers are heavily involved in the implementation of transnational reform policies, policies that they often helped design.

### THE CREATION OF REGIMES

Regime creation is a two-stage process. Content is created and disseminated by a variety of methods. It is actually easier to describe the processes by which regime norms are disseminated than it is to discern their origins.

Content is created by the reciprocal interchange of ideas and policy advocacy among all five regime communities. Some ideas on what policing is for and how to do it have acquired the status of the obvious. Content seems not to be directly based on research or evidence but on research (most commonly conducted by the scholarly community) findings mediated by the experience of the police and policy makers.

The dissemination of democratic policing norms and practices has occurred in numerous ways and has been done by all regime communities. Methods range from appeals to professional states, *quid pro quo* negotiations, salesmanship, semicoercive persuasion, and straightforward imposition.

Police listen to police. Advice given by one police officer to another, on the basis of professional equality and comradeship, has more persuasive power than the most erudite findings and arguments of consultants and NGOs. I would guess that one of the reasons one finds a large number of ex-police among transnational policy makers is their capacity to present themselves as knowledgeable both in the theory and practices of good policing. And there is a natural curiosity among the best of police personnel that can be harnessed for reform.

Transnational activities by police umbrella organizations (conferences, the harmonization of training under regional or national auspices) or agency-to-agency interchanges shuttle ideas across borders. Similarly, conferences and workshops organized by think tanks, NGOs, or scholars disseminate ideas among like-minded individuals. International training activities in transnational settings such as the ILEA or MEPA or in home

countries (e.g., international courses at the FBI Academy, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Bramshill, St. Cyr, and the Polizeiakademie in Münster, Germany) transmit information but also encourage networking and informal getting-to-know-each-other activities (e.g., Marenin, 1998b).

The International Police Executive Symposium founded by Dilip Das is a hybrid of sorts. Its annual conferences bring together police practitioners and academics from across the world for an exchange of views and skills for dealing with generic policing problems and situations (e.g., public order, trafficking in people).

Dixon (2000), discussing the situation in South Africa, noted the salesmanship involved in pushing policies such as zero tolerance that may have little utility for the country. Such strategies are promoted because they have “worked” in other countries, at least from the perception of the salesperson. Brogden (1999) argued that community policing is aggressively sold to others because that is what the sellers have to offer even when it is unlikely that conditions are ripe for this style of policing. Salesmanship is grounded in a certain naiveté about how policing reforms work, and sellers tend to underplay or ignore the importance of contexts. It worked for us, so it will work for you. Buy it, and pay me well. It will be interesting to see what advice the \$4.3 million paid to the Giuliani Partners consulting team by the Mexico City government will produce (Weiner, 2003). Given that Bill Bratton is part of the firm, some versions of Compstat and zero tolerance seem good candidates.

The Phare<sup>11</sup> process created by the European Union to assess the potential for and achievement of democratic norms in various social sectors, including the criminal justice system and the police, is the best example of a semicoercive, quid pro quo process. Candidate countries that wish to join the European Union (basically for economic reasons) or other European arrangements (such as the Schengen space) are graded on their performance by a complex set of standards (the so-called Copenhagen criteria or, more generally, adherence to the *acquis communautaire*, the huge body of EU law), encouraged to upgrade their practices to EU norms, and given assistance. The European Union says it will let you in, but you have to change your ways. Candidate countries agree to this invasion of their sovereign space because they consider that the economic benefits will outweigh the insults; and, possibly, because reformers in those countries are convinced that Western policing models are both more effective and just alternatives to the systems of their past.

The activities of CIVPOL personnel—as these have shifted over time from monitoring, advising, and partnering to operational authority in the Kosovo and East Timor interventions—have a semicoercive flavor (Hansen, 2002). What the Council of Europe and OSCE law enforcement personnel are doing currently in Serbia and Bosnia—where they have, basically, been contracted to manage all policing reforms and coordinate international assistance programs (in Serbia) or have almost total control over the practices and personnel of the police (in Bosnia-Herzegovina)—is close to semicoercion as well with a negotiated overlay that mutual cooperation is desirable.

Efforts by the United States and allies in Afghanistan and Iraq are closest to the imposition process. The Kabul government has little choice but to agree to whatever reforms are imposed on it because it has no independent capacity to ensure its own survival. I suppose Iraq will follow this pattern. Of course, the imposition is disguised by a rhetoric of mutual consultation and service in the best interests of the client state.

## FROM POLICE STUDIES TO STUDIES OF POLICING

### SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AS A FRAMEWORK FOR MAKING SENSE OF POLICING DEVELOPMENTS

The notion and practice of SSR arose in two disparate fields (Caparini, 2002, 2003; Chanaa, 2002; Henderson, 1999; Henderson & Karkoszka, 2002; Winkler, 2002). One is the field of civil-military relations and the other the foreign-aid community. A core concern of civil military studies is democratic control of the armed forces and related agencies. Foreign-aid and economic-development agencies (the World Bank, foreign-aid offices in donor countries, and NGOs interested in economic and political development) have realized that economic foreign aid, even if effectively utilized in the recipient countries, will not sustain economic development unless the effects of aid are distributed in a somewhat equitable manner and conditions of domestic security have been stabilized (e.g., reducing the likelihood of military coups or the incidence of crime). A minimal level of order and security is a precondition for economic development. If people have no faith that what they have struggled to acquire through aid and hard work will not be stolen by corrupt officials or destroyed by crime or violence and they themselves are not safe, then economic aid means little. Security and

development go hand in hand (e.g., Department for International Development, 2002; Inter-American Development Bank, 1997; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2000; United Nations, 2002).

In short, a threshold level of security is an essential condition for the very possibility of policing. Policing does not create security where none exists but comes in only when minimal order has been created by the actions of civic society or international imposition. Only then can state-centered policing reinforce order. As an official once told me, in Bosnia the military were the 911 hotline for CIVPOL. Whom do you call when the police are threatened? The military (Perito, personal communication, May 25, 2004).

A large security sector, mainly the military, is a drain on the limited resources of transitional and developing countries. It is far better for those resources to be invested in productive ways that improve the lives of people. Reforms seek to accomplish both more democratic control over the security sector and a redistribution of resources to other sectors while maintaining the minimal levels of security essential for a legitimate government. SSR is good governance.

The security sector notion is a flexible concept (e.g., Hutchful, 2003). At the minimum, it includes the agencies of (potential) coercion controlled by the state, which are charged with the protection of civic society and the state (armed forces, police, border control systems, intelligence agencies, and co-opted informal control mechanisms) as well as other agencies whose work is essential to sustain the effectiveness and accountability of the agencies of control (courts, legal systems, oversight mechanisms, budget agencies, etc.). A more inclusive conception of the security sector would include correctional systems, economic support for control agencies, or civic society participation in social control.

The police are part of the security sector and reform of the security sector will necessarily affect the police. The police are part of a system of social defense and will be closely enmeshed with other agencies. Under the pressures of globalization and the current hegemony of neo-liberal (or neo-conservative) ideologies, policing systems will be caught up in the discourse of securitization (Loader, 2002). Policing space expands to connect to other security areas threatened by new risks and vulnerabilities both above the state into transnational cooperation and below the state to harness civic society to state-centered security efforts. A focus on the governance of security (however the sector is defined) automatically shifts empirical and theoretical attention to all means and processes by which security is sought and governed. If security is provided for much of the population by informal means, what

then are the values protected by informal agency, and what means exist for the democratic governance of non-state-security systems? If security comes to society through international imposition or aid, what inspires confidence that suggested reforms will work as intended over long periods of time, and how do local accountability measures mesh with the lack of local capacity to assert or impose accountability on international actors? If security is a marketable and marketed commodity, what equivalent of regulating the invisible hand of the allocation of resources and benefits will prevent and control abuses in the policing system?

In short, SSR points to the systemic connections of the police to wider security concerns; it stresses the inherently political nature of trying to reform policing systems, especially by the notions of democratic control and good governance; and it points to the importance of rights as a counterbalance to demands for security in a democratic system.<sup>12</sup>

SSR also argues the importance of legitimating new forms and means of coercion. Reforms are threats to some special interests and beneficial to others. Affected groups will support or oppose reform. The important issue in this process is the autonomous capacity of the police to affect their own future and to shape the legitimation of other social, political, and economic changes that will be going on.

As Hills (1996, 2000) argued quite persuasively, the police are always part of other societal changes but not in lockstep with these. Hills pointed out that political reforms in African states have had little effect on the policing systems of those states (with minor variations). That is only possible if the police are somewhat detached by the nature of their structure and work from social forces that have produced other changes. That detachment or semiautonomy also gives policing systems the ability to influence the nature of democratic reforms and their legitimation.

Good governance of the security sector, understood as effective democratic control over security agencies to ensure effective and efficient performance by them, combines normative expectations with scientific assessments of performance, leading to a lessons-learned and best practices approach to reform.

In sum, SSR highlights the political nature of policing and reforms and reaffirms the continuing vitality of the state in social ordering (Loader & Walker, 2001; Tanner, 2000). The state has not disappeared or lost its importance in processes of globalization and the commodification of security. The state's continuing vitality suggests that the expansion of policing space has been less pervasive in practice than in theories of the demise of the

state and state-centered policing. Policing space has expanded, and other policing activities have developed, but the effect of the expansion of policing space on security and rights differs significantly by region and levels of modernization.

Expanding the theoretical overview of policing to take into account the expansion of policing space does not demote conventional studies of the police. Even in SSR, analyses of policing developments and reform programs must be informed by the findings of police studies. If not done, policy and reform advocacy will treat the police and the policing systems of states as a near black box—inputs are entered and outcomes are expected and promised but without any clear sense of why inputs would transform the (unknown) workings of policing inside the box into desired outcomes. SSR can provide the framework for combining conventional police studies with the political realities and needs for domestic and transnational democratic governance of the expanded policing space.

The question of oversight and accountability is crucial to good governance. Much of the literature in police studies—being tied to Weberian conceptions of the nature of policing or a policing system that is located in the institutions of the state—conceives of democratic oversight as requiring particular institutional means (e.g., courts, ombudsmen, internal affairs, or media). Yet if policing has moved beyond and below the state into new domains and functions, traditional institutional mechanisms of control are not likely to work well. New policing arrangements and processes, themselves changing as they are being invented and reproduced, require control mechanisms that respond to a fluid and open-ended process.

Rather than concentrate on institutions, oversight will need to focus on the processes by which domestic and transnational regimes are created and implemented—that is, on how values of good policing are propagated and consumed (or not)—and seek to influence the process to produce desired institutional outcomes. As well, “evaluative techniques capable of penetrating the dynamics of those networks have to be developed” (Johnston, 1998, p. 214). The notion of a global civic society akin to domestic interest groups supports a process approach to governance. Outcomes should be institutionalized, but an immediate focus on institutions will basically create empty organizations that look democratic by their mission statement and official rhetoric but lack the internal cultures to believe in and carry out proper policies and oversight. Policing systems will be empty in that sense unless democratic values become part of the managerial and operational practices of the police.

## IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDYING POLICING

The most obvious implication of regime communities is that studies of policing are done by numerous groups and agencies, and there exists an active and reciprocal commerce in ideas on policing across the regime communities. Police studies, the scholars' preserve, approaches the topic of policing with the arsenal of methodologies and theoretical approaches dominant in its community of scholars. Some police scholars do good work, and others barely manage to ask the right questions. Yet other communities also study policing as they do it (e.g., the police) or as they advocate, carry out, and evaluate the effects of police reform programs. Some police are good at understanding and explaining their work whereas others bungle along, and that is true for members of think tank, policy, and NGO communities as well. Which regime community one is a member of at any given time does not determine the quality of how the study of policing is conducted. The point made here is that police studies (or academics), by and large, have not yet reached out or recognized the valid and theoretically sophisticated studies of policing that are done in the other communities. Changing the focus and field from police studies to studying policing will accommodate the objective expansion of policing space in the intellectual practices appropriate for the field.

A second consequence of networking across regime communities is that much of the gap in comparative and international studies between English-speaking Western and non-English-speaking or non-Western settings is more apparent among research than among practitioner communities, who often work in non-Western settings. There are best practices and lessons learned from both research and experience, and these can be synthesized by interactions among regime communities. Yet these networks among regime communities and their effect on shaping the future of policing systems worldwide are little studied.

A third implication for the study of policing stems from the reciprocal nature of networking. Much of support for and advocacy of policing reforms flows from those countries that consider themselves to be democratic and have resources to countries in transition, development, or social chaos. Some of the processes and consequences of reform promotion have been studied but as a one-way street mainly. Very little attention has been paid to the effects of promoting democratic reforms back on sponsoring or donor countries. Does anything flow back from the experience of having done reforms elsewhere?

A fourth implication is this: If policing is so visibly and heavily a political activity in transnational cooperation and reform efforts, it follows that policing has as much a political nature at home. Once understood, this places the demands by the police for greater professionalism and autonomy (e.g., in the United States or the United Kingdom) squarely into the democratic political process. Democracy is a balancing act among competing visions and values, and policing ideologies and claims are part of walking the democratic tightrope (Brogden, 1982; Marenin, 1990). Claims made by the police are part of the politics of policing and have no more or less standing to be acknowledged than the claims of any other politically interested groups.

Fifth, much of international policing and reforms programs focus on state policing. It has been difficult, even within the SSR framework, to include studies of non-state-centered policing developments into the overall goals of achieving good governance and democratic oversight. In a sense, one of the major concerns of policing scholars—the expansion of policing space and how to understand and deal with it—has not yet filtered into the practices of transnational regime communities.

Sixth, and this is the main point, a global police studies community already exists, yet it is one in which scholars are only one sectoral element. The coalescing regime communities at the international level are producing studies of policing in the new policing space that will need to be included and incorporated into the growing body of knowledge on all aspects of policing. Each community has its particular strengths, when studies are done well, and all deserve a place in the community of scholars of policing.

## NOTES

1. Manning (2000) made the point that although “something is known of the form of cooperative relationships [among police agencies within and across the various states], little is known of the actual ‘content’ of information exchanged between agencies and the consequences, if any, of such exchanges. This remains difficult to determine for any given force, let alone international exchanges, and yet this is likely to hold the key for understanding the emergent transnational policing ‘system’” (p. 194).

2. The notion that policing is a core political activity in any society (in addition to being a practical exercise of persuasion and coercion for purposes of social control) differs from more conventional discussions of the politics of policing that stress the instrumentalist capacities of the police to support dominant social practices, conceptions of order, and the fortunes of political elites. The police can do all of that, but they also mean more to people,

civic society, and the state. They are more than tools in the hands of wielders of power. They are (semi)autonomous actors in the reproduction of democratic (or undemocratic) societies.

3. Bigo (2000) argued that the “interlocking of internal and external security is not a reflection of an increase in the threats facing modern society. Rather it is a lowering of the threshold of threat acceptance maintained by social controllers in tandem with the upsurge of the use of police methods themselves. . . . In theory, the security programme with the same coercive solutions and the militarisation of society’s preserve can be applied to both Russian aggression and the anti-social behavior of children. . . . In order to understand these transformations, we have to view them [social controllers] as agents in one and the same field, a field where internal and external (in)security have merged” (pp. 83-84).

4. As Waddington (2001) noted, “Legal obligations and accountability procedures are less instruments of social control than symbolic expressions of political culture” (p. 5).

5. Maurice Punch remarked in his discussion, semifacetiously, that the police, after having responded to a call, might hand out a printed card saying, “Thank you for calling us. We know you could have used another service.” Frequent fliers are familiar with this phrase.

6. To quote Hills (2000), “The police can thus be taken as a barometer of the progress a government has made toward serving popular interests and needs, since such a government would presumably not fear its own population and would therefore be able to provide noncoercive policing” (p. 175).

7. One consequence is that non-native English speakers tend to be much more informed about comparative and international policing developments, or are less parochial, than native English-speaking scholars, especially from the United States. Others will know the English police literature and at least one in another language.

8. There really is no comprehensive, general, or comparative non-Marxist interpretation of the role of policing in state-society relations or of the forces and processes that have led to the formation of policing systems and to recent reconceptualizations of the expansion of policing space.

9. One of the most fascinating gaps in research on policing is the career patterns and mobility of members of the transnational regime community(ies). There seem to be a fairly small number of core members of the international policing regime community (the usual suspects) whose names show up in numerous venues (or different regime communities) with a larger number of more marginal disseminators of ideas and practices.

10. In practice and theory, global consulting is seen by consultants as no different from the vast consulting business on policing that goes on domestically in all countries. Because policing is seen to be basically preoccupied with similar problems, consulting across international borders presents no greater difficulties than consulting across state lines or agency jurisdictions in the United States. The problem with this view is that contexts are given domestically but not transnationally. Crossing domestic state lines is qualitatively different from crossing international borders for the purpose of advice and assistance. But few consultants have the time or experience to immerse themselves in contexts. Getting a sense of the situation (i.e., understanding the basic dynamics of contexts) comes before trying to make sense of the policing being studied.

11. The Phare process is mostly an assistance program by EU countries for candidate countries to encourage them to meet EU norms and expectations of democratic performance in many areas. But implied in evaluating the need for and the effects of aid are criteria, such

as accountability procedures for the police, on which candidate countries are graded over time.

12. So far, security sector reform (SSR) has been concerned mainly with governance of the military, although occasional references to other security organizations of the states (and less occasionally to non-state-security mechanisms) can be found. The framework has not yet been sufficiently theorized to match the expansion of the security sector of which the policing systems are one major element. Nor have the notions of what good governance means for a wider conception of SSR been addressed. The focus is still on the more limited question of who keeps the militaries in check and how.

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