

# American Behavioral Scientist

<http://abs.sagepub.com>

---

## **Economic Globalization and Homelessness in Japan**

Miki Hasegawa

*American Behavioral Scientist* 2005; 48; 989

DOI: 10.1177/0002764204274206

The online version of this article can be found at:

<http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/48/8/989>

---

Published by:



<http://www.sagepublications.com>

**Additional services and information for *American Behavioral Scientist* can be found at:**

**Email Alerts:** <http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts>

**Subscriptions:** <http://abs.sagepub.com/subscriptions>

**Reprints:** <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav>

**Permissions:** <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>

**Citations** <http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/48/8/989>

# Economic Globalization and Homelessness in Japan

MIKI HASEGAWA

*Tokiwa University*

*This article traces the origins of the recent growth of homelessness in Japan to the following three structural changes that occurred in the 1980s in association with economic globalization: (a) a shift from a manufacturing to a service economy, (b) urban redevelopment, and (c) government policy shifts toward deregulation and privatization. The study indicates that a growing segment of Japan's low-income workforce has been subject to exclusion from employment, housing, and welfare.*

**Keywords:** homelessness; day labor; globalization; social exclusion; Japan

## INTRODUCTION

In Japan, homelessness means sleeping in public places, such as the streets, parks, riversides, and train stations. According to the most recent government enumeration, there are slightly more than 25,000 homeless people across the country (Kôsei rôdôsho, 2003).<sup>1</sup> Surveys and close observers of the homeless suggest that the population is largely comprised of middle-aged and elderly single men. In a national survey conducted in early 2002 (Kôsei rôdôsho, 2003) and local surveys carried out in major cities in the 1990s,<sup>2</sup> men accounted for 95% to 98% of the homeless interviewed, and roughly one half of them were in their 50s and one quarter in their 60s. The rest were mostly in their 40s. Large-scale surveys in Tokyo<sup>3</sup> (Toshi seikatsu kenkyû kai, 2000) and Osaka City (Osaka City University, 2000) that collected data on marital status further reported that at least 90% of the homeless were currently single, with only half of them ever married. Furthermore, the majority finished compulsory education, or junior high school, at best.<sup>4</sup>

Homelessness in Japan first became noticeable in the 1980s among day laborers in *yoseba* districts. Yoseba denotes a day labor market. Since the latter half of the 1970s, it has operated largely for the construction industry (Nakane,

---

**Author's Note:** *I thank the anonymous reviewers for providing me with very helpful comments on the first draft of this article.*

AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 48 No. 8, April 2005 989-1012

DOI: 10.1177/0002764204274206

© 2005 Sage Publications

2002). Yoseba exist or open up in cities across the country, but the largest and most institutionalized are San'ya (covering Taito and Arakawa Wards, Tokyo), Kamagasaki (Osaka City, Osaka), Kotobuki (Yokohama City, Kanagawa), and Sasajima (Nagoya City, Aichi). The first three are embedded in flophouse quarters and are often compared to skid row in the United States (Ezawa, 2002; Gill, 2001). For the yoseba day laborer, temporary homelessness was part of life because every lean season meant possible or actual loss of any form of housing. During the 1980s, especially in the latter half of the decade however, sleeping rough became a long-term condition for a number of older yoseba men (K. Shima, 1999; Umezawa, 1995).<sup>5</sup>

Homelessness then drew wide public attention as it grew rapidly well beyond yoseba districts. In central Tokyo, or 23 wards of the Tokyo Metropolis, the number of people sleeping in selected public places more than doubled between 1993 and 1994, from 461 to 1,137 (Tokyoto, 1995) and reached 5,800 by 1999 (Tokyoto, 2001). In and around Kamagasaki between 1994 and 1998, the number of homeless people rose from 1,641 to 3,814, and in August 1998, the city counted a total of 8,660 homeless in its entire jurisdiction (K. Shima, 1999). Moreover, surveys of the 1990s constantly found that 40% to 60% of the homeless had never had contact with yoseba districts before they became homeless. A majority of these nonyoseba men had worked in nonconstruction industries, whereas others had been construction day laborers but not from yoseba districts. As the aforementioned national survey (Kôsei rôdôsho, 2003) revealed, today an even higher rate of homelessness is found among these nonyoseba men than in the 1990s.

The appearance of nonyoseba men in the homeless population has highlighted two different approaches to explain increased homelessness: one that emphasizes a shrinking role of the yoseba system to accommodate downwardly mobile single men and one that emphasizes broader changes that have placed a growing proportion of the Japanese at risk of unemployment, poverty, and homelessness. This article builds on both approaches to explain why homelessness began to increase in the early 1990s. Specifically, it traces the preconditions for increased homelessness to the following three structural changes that occurred in the 1980s in association with economic globalization: (a) a shift from a manufacturing to a service economy, (b) urban redevelopment and gentrification, and (c) government policy shifts toward deregulation and privatization, including privatization of welfare.

In what follows, I first elaborate the existing approaches and underscore my own with some pertinent data. I then discuss the structural changes in four parts. The first three deal with the general processes of the industrial shift, urban redevelopment, and government policy shifts, respectively. The fourth part focuses on the yoseba system and shows how it has interacted with the more general processes. Finally, I conclude this study by arguing that a larger segment of the low-income workforce in Japan has been excluded from employment, housing, and welfare.

### EXPLAINING HOMELESSNESS IN JAPAN

Although by now a large body of literature exists on homelessness in Japan, only a small portion discusses the causes of increased homelessness. Within the portion, whereas early writings tended to stress the immediate effect of a recession that began in the early 1990s (Ezawa, 2002), more recently, researchers have sought structural underpinnings of the phenomenon. Two main approaches are discernible in the structural writings: the yoseba approach and what may be called the postindustrialist approach. The yoseba approach looks to changes in the yoseba system, or yoseba districts as they are linked to the construction industry. Researchers interested in a range of yoseba issues (e.g., Nakane, 2002; K. Shima, 1999; Tamaki & Yamaguchi, 2000; Yamaguchi, 2001) adopt this approach and share the assumption that although the yoseba system once played an employment buffer role by accommodating downwardly mobile single men, through the years, this role has shrunk, if not totally disappeared, as labor suppliers created large labor camps beyond the districts and began recruiting younger labor, sometimes from abroad, to reinforce labor control, secure physically strong labor, and reduce labor costs.

Although this approach is concerned about changes in the yoseba system, the postindustrial approach particularly emphasizes the appearance of nonconstruction workers in the homeless population and proposes that the contemporary homelessness problem in Japan be viewed against the backdrop of changes that are taking place in postindustrial societies at large. Thus, researchers who take this approach stress the need to “go beyond the physical and psychological boundaries of the yoseba” (Kennett & Iwata, 2003, p. 62) or to look at processes “which point to other routes to homelessness which bypass the yoseba system” (Guzewicz, 2000, p. 61) to understand how and why homelessness has increased in the country. Changes in Japan to which these researchers have drawn our attention include corporate restructuring, social drift, and disintegration (Guzewicz, 2000) and rationalization and globalization under which problems such as poverty and unemployment have arisen among a broad segment of the population, including the young, the old, and minorities (Kennett & Iwata, 2003).

Although both of these approaches help us understand the reasons behind the rise in homelessness, neither by itself offers a satisfactory explanation. Because the yoseba approach leaves the question of what had happened to the homeless with no experience of day laboring in construction unanswered, it only helps us to understand, after all, why homelessness has become a long-term condition for older yoseba men. As the postindustrial approach indicates, as will the data presented next, it is increasingly difficult to attribute the growth of homelessness solely to the decline of the yoseba system. With its primary concerns lying outside causal analysis however, the postindustrial approach has so far provided only broad contexts within which homelessness has risen. Although summaries of these contexts illuminate how the Japanese today are no exception in facing uncertain futures, including homelessness, they are too far reaching if we are to

explain the specific phenomenon of homelessness. The current state of research demands an analytical framework that is broader than the yoseba approach and more focused than the postindustrial approach.

What is worth mentioning in this regard is the effort that a few researchers have made to relate homelessness to economic globalization (e.g., Narita, 1996; Tamaki, 2003). Although the postindustrial approach treats globalization as contextual, these researchers assume a direct link between homelessness and globalization. Most notably, Tamaki (2003) highlighted the fact that many of the construction day laborers who became homeless used to have regular manufacturing jobs when younger and related homelessness among them to globalization phenomena, above all, deindustrialization and the flow of cheap foreign labor who increasingly replaced older domestic labor. In this study, I extend the notion of economic globalization to the larger low-income workforce as well as to urban space, with special attention to older single men. The former includes day laborers in the construction industry and the latter yoseba districts. Specifically, the present study discusses the following three dimensions of globalization that I consider as key to understanding today's homelessness in Japan: (a) a shift from a manufacturing to a service economy, (b) urban redevelopment and gentrification, and (c) government policy shifts toward deregulation and privatization. The main argument is that these structural changes, which combined in the 1980s, paved a way to increased homelessness in the 1990s.

### **WORK AND HOUSING BACKGROUNDS OF THE HOMELESS**

Before I discuss the structural changes, I describe the work and housing backgrounds of the homeless to underscore the need to pay more analytic attention to nonconstruction workers who have experienced homelessness. The largest survey that provides detailed data on the work backgrounds of the homeless is that of Tokyo (Toshi seikatsu kenkyû kai, 2000). I draw attention to three facts that these data offer (see Table 1).<sup>6</sup> First, when younger, nearly 60% of the respondents held regular jobs, most often in manufacturing and second most often in services and construction. Second, just before becoming homeless however, 65% of those who had jobs then (90% of all respondents) held casual jobs. Although these casual jobs predominantly involved day laboring in construction, many were also present in the manufacturing and service sectors. Third, at the same time, immediately before they began to sleep rough, about 30% of the respondents held regular jobs, most often in manufacturing but also in services.<sup>7</sup>

These figures clearly demonstrate that homelessness today afflicts not only yoseba men but also other casual and regular workers in the major sectors of the economy. They also indicate that through the years, the employment status of the homeless deteriorated so that fewer people held regular jobs by the time they

**TABLE 1: Work Backgrounds of Homeless People in Tokyo (in percentages)**

	<i>Management</i>	<i>Regular</i>	<i>Self-Employed</i>	<i>Temporary or Part-Time</i>	<i>Day Labor</i>	<i>Total</i>
Longest held jobs <sup>a</sup>						
White collar	1.3	7.1	0.4	0.3	0.0	9.1
Blue collar in construction	0.0	10.8	1.5	6.1	20.7	39.1
Blue collar in nonconstruction	0.0	27.6	1.5	4.0	1.0	34.1
Service	0.3	10.9	1.5	1.8	0.3	14.8
Others	0.1	1.6	0.9	0.1	0.1	2.8
Total	1.7	58.0	5.8	12.3	22.1	100
Jobs held just before homelessness <sup>b</sup>						
White collar	0.8	3.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	4.5
Blue collar in construction	0.0	6.6	1.0	8.1	44.9	60.6
Blue collar in nonconstruction	0.0	13.3	1.0	5.5	2.5	22.3
Service	0.2	6.6	0.8	3.3	0.5	11.4
Others	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.0	1.1
Total	1.2	29.8	3.8	17.2	47.9	100

SOURCE: Hagiwara (2001).

NOTE: Total figures do not necessarily sum up due to rounding.

a. *N* = 677.

b. *N* = 602.

became homeless. In this study, I link this phenomenon to a shift from a manufacturing to a service economy. The erosion of manufacturing has entailed not only a smaller share of manufacturing workers in the total workforce but also a growing proportion of casual workers in the shrinking manufacturing workforce. The concomitant growth of the service sector has involved even faster casualization of labor as well as proliferation of low-wage jobs, casual or regular, as the manufacturing sector lost its power to set wages (Sassen, 1991). Furthermore, regular jobs homeless people held, when younger or older, were mostly in the secondary labor market, as indicated by their high rates of single-ness coupled by low levels of education and by the smallness of the companies where they once worked (Sasajima mondai wo kangaeru kai, 2000). The industrial shift was detrimental especially to older male workers in smaller firms, characterized by lower levels of wages, job security, and unionization.

Detailed housing backgrounds of the homeless are provided by the Tokyo survey again (Toshi seikatsu kenkyû kai, 2000). For present purposes, this survey offers the following important findings. First, when younger, nearly half of the respondents were in "stable housing" (owned home and private apartment) as opposed to "precarious housing" (flophouse, labor camp, and company-run unit). Second, by the time the respondents were at risk of homelessness, this proportion decreased to less than one third. Third, in the past or more recently, relatively high proportions of the respondents lived in private apartments (29% in the past and 23% more recently) on which low-income workers in Japan usually depend (Fukuda, 1996). In Nagoya, 23% of the homeless surveyed in 1994 were in this type of housing just before they became homeless (Sasajima no genjô wo akirakani suru kai, 1995). In Hiroshima where there is no yoseba district, nearly half of the homeless interviewed in 1998 began to sleep rough after losing private apartments (Hiroshima rojô-seikatsu wo akirakani suru kai, 2002).

These figures suggest that today, flophouses are not the only housing arrangement from which low-income workers become homeless; on the contrary, many experience homelessness straight from relatively stable forms of housing, especially private rental apartments. And just like their employment status, the overall housing status of the homeless declined over time. In this study, I relate the phenomenon to urban redevelopment. Urban redevelopment unfolds as economic globalization requires centralized management and raises demand for office space for firms and housing space for high-income earners (Sassen, 1991). This process often accompanies gentrification or the erosion of low-income housing by office, commercial, and higher-income housing space. To show how these processes actually occurred, I introduce the case of Tokyo in this article. In the 1980s, the city of Tokyo underwent numerous large redevelopment projects, and a number of low-income rental units disappeared as a result. The industrial shift alone does not explain increased homelessness in the 1990s; urban redevelopment, which constitutes another key element of globalization, also contributed to it.

## FROM MANUFACTURING TO SERVICE

To understand how and why a number of low-income workers became vulnerable to homelessness in the 1980s, it is imperative first to recognize the dual structure of the Japanese labor market and a change in the power relationship between large manufacturers and their regular employees. Since the high growth period between the late 1950s and the early 1970s, the labor market in Japan has been divided between the primary and secondary sectors (M. Nomura, 1998; Tokita, 1997). The primary sector consists of regular workers in large firms. Today, these workers account for 12% of all nonagrarian employees (Chûshô kigyôchô, 2003). The so-called Japanese type of labor management, characterized by lifetime employment, seniority-based wages, and enterprise unionism (Ando & Ishikawa, 1980; Itoh, 1990), takes place, if and when it still does, in this sector. Secondary workers who comprise the vast majority of the nonagrarian workforce are in medium-sized and small firms<sup>8</sup> and usually enjoy lower levels of wages, unionization, and employment security (Ando & Ishikawa, 1980; Tokita, 1997).

Although the dual structure of the labor market persists, in the latter half of the 1970s, the power relationship between large firms and their regular employees changed to the disadvantage of the latter as the position of primary workers in the key manufacturing sector declined. The decline occurred as large manufacturers tried to recover from a falling rate of profit. The profit rate in manufacturing dropped in the early 1970s from 47% in 1970 to 34% in 1973 (Itoh, 1990) due to a labor shortage and a rise in prices of primary products imported from developing countries, both of which began at the end of the 1960s, as well as growing labor disputes, which occurred in the early 1970s (Itoh, 1990). Through the oil crisis in 1973, the profit rate further plunged to 10% in 1975 (Itoh, 1990). Following the oil crisis, large manufacturers took a series of measures to counter the falling rate of profit, including downsizing (Shimoyama, 1980), introduction of new micro electronics (ME) automation systems into factories and offices (Takahashi, 1990), and promotion of quality control (QC) circles and zero defect (ZD) campaigns on the shop floor (Itoh, 1990).

For primary workers in the manufacturing sector, these efforts to raise labor productivity and profits meant depressed wages and vulnerability to downward relocation, temporary transfer, and firing (Ando & Ishikawa, 1980). This situation lasted as Japan experienced the second oil shock in 1979 and manufacturers took advantage of the Japanese-type labor management to continue with downsizing and labor intensification (Itoh, 1990). The declined position of primary workers in the manufacturing sector signaled the demise of a Fordist regime, which had assured a more equal share of the fruit of better productivity (Itoh, 1990). It also had an important bearing on the economic well-being of workers in the secondary labor market because it laid the foundation for economic globalization (Sassen, 1991). As in many other developed countries, economic



globalization in Japan has entailed a shift from a manufacturing to a service economy (Iyotani, 1993; Sassen, 1991). Reflecting the decline in the position of manufacturing workers, the shift has accompanied casualization of labor and proliferation of low-wage jobs, especially in the expanding service sector. For workers in smaller firms, the shift has further meant increasing vulnerability to the decision of large firms, including transnationals.

In the 1980s, the shift from a manufacturing to a service economy occurred as growing numbers of large firms, manufacturing or otherwise, turned to overseas operation. Overseas operation took the forms of direct foreign investment (DFI), or the acquirement or establishment of firms abroad, and foreign securities investment, or cross-border transactions of bonds and equities. Both types of investment grew especially in the latter half of the decade. The annual flow of DFI grew six times between 1984 and 1989, from slightly more than \$10 billion to \$67.5 billion (Okurasho, 1996); that of securities investment grew even more sharply, from \$57.9 to \$1,780 billion in the same period (Okurasho, 1996). Breakdown of DFI in the latter half of the 1980s shows that although finance and insurance kept high levels of share (around 30%), as well as real estate (16% to 18%), growth of manufacturing was pronounced, as its share rose from 17% in 1986 to nearly 30% in 1988 (Tsusansho, 1989). With all services taken together however, growth of this sector was also prominent; the proportion of services in DFI, which was already more than 60% in the first half of the 1980s, further increased to 77% in 1986 (Sassen, 1991).

The rapid increase in DFI in manufacturing undermined the domestic manufacturing sector as firms increasingly relocated production sites to the United States and low-wage countries in Asia and as the overseas affiliates increasingly procured materials and parts from within these countries and exported manufactured goods back to Japan. By 1990, the ratio of overseas production against domestic production (measured in sales) had grown to 6.4% from 3.0% in 1985 (Tsusansho, 1995). Import of industrial products from foreign affiliates grew especially from Asian countries. In 1986, such imports from North America and Asia stood at \$981 million and \$3,451 million, respectively; these figures jumped to \$2,193 million and \$5,345 million in 1987 and then kept rising throughout the decade (Tokita, 1997). Another main factor responsible for the decline in manufacturing was large-scale downsizing that occurred in the old leading industries (e.g., steel, mining, and shipbuilding), which had been taken over by the consumer electronics and auto industries (Sassen, 1991; Takahashi, 1990).

At the same time, active DFI and securities investment helped expand the service sector as they promoted transnationalization of large firms in both manufacturing and services. As cross-border investments rose, large firms became increasingly transnational. Between 1975 and 1987, the number of transnationals increased from 37 to 121 (Machimura, 1994).<sup>9</sup> These firms concentrated in major cities as they needed centralized management of global networks of

factories and financial markets as well as advanced telecommunication facilities for such management (Sassen, 1991). In cities such as Tokyo, these transnational firms, as well as smaller firms in all industries, generated demand for specialized services as intermediate inputs. Thus, producer services, or services for organizations, grew, such as banking, insurance, real estate, engineering, accounting, and legal services. In Tokyo, the number of establishments offering these services increased from about 55,000 in 1981 to about 84,000 in 1996 (Tokyo, 2000). At the national level, between 1970 and 1990, the employment in producer services more than doubled from 2.5 to 5.9 million while the total employment rose from 52.1 to 61.7 million (Sassen, 1994).

Accordingly, the proportion of service workers in the total workforce increased from 52.0% in 1975 to 59.2% in 1990 while that of manufacturing workers decreased from 25.0% to 23.5% (Tokyo, 1998). As I mentioned earlier however, the shift accompanied casualization of labor and proliferation of low-wage jobs, especially in the service sector. In manufacturing, the percentage of casual workers increased from 12.8% in 1987 to 13.6% in 1994 (Tokita, 1997). In services, casualization of labor progressed faster so that the percentage of casual workers in the total nonagrarian workforce rose from 16.0% to 20.7% in the same period. During the 1980s, average monthly earnings of workers (in establishments with 30 or more workers) were above the national average in manufacturing, transport and communications, and finance and insurance, but in many service industries, they fell below the average (Sassen, 1991). In particular, retail, hotel, catering, and health services had lowest average earnings in the decade (Sassen, 1994).

With the industrial shift, employment uncertainties among secondary workers spread as increasing numbers of medium-sized and small firms began to face difficulties in continuing business. In manufacturing, as large firms engaged in business overseas, their subcontractors were put under competition with overseas producers and among themselves. Although for subcontractors the greatest advantage of producing for parent firms lie in the relative stability of workload, from the mid-1980s, many of them lost this advantage as parent firms began to select firms that could meet the twin challenge of cost reduction and development of specialized technologies (Chûshô kigyôchô, 1997). This led to polarization of subcontractors because not all of them could deal with the daunting challenge successfully. The decline of smaller firms can be seen geographically. In Japan, there are numerous industrial districts with small firms that have often developed intricate internal systems of division of labor to serve large firms. However, in the 1980s, many of those districts shrank as some firms relocated their production sites in and out of Japan, often following their parent firms, and others permanently closed their business due to bankruptcy, lack of successors, or reluctance to continue business (Chûshô kigyôchô, 1997).<sup>10</sup>

A similar phenomenon occurred in the service sector as well. Although this sector grew due largely to the expansion of producer services, the growth

depended more on large firms than on smaller firms whose main customers remained consumers (Chûshô kigyôchô, 1997). Among smaller firms, competition was pronounced between small retailers and growing convenience stores and large supermarkets. Backed by large capital, these stores used ME technologies, offered lower prices, and/or adopted themselves to the changing consumer preferences, which were difficult for small retailers (Chûshô kigyô jigydân, 1992). In the 1980s, commercial districts across the country declined as neighborhood retailers and specialty stores became increasingly overpowered by convenience stores and supermarkets established elsewhere (Chûshô kigyô jigydân, 1992). The smaller the store, the more it suffered aging of the owner, difficulty in securing a successor, and lack of automation and motivation. Thus, in the 1980s, small retailers closed their business more often than they started it (Chûshô kigyô jigydân, 1992).

Although these developments affected secondary workers in general, from the viewpoint of increased homelessness, they worked to the disadvantage especially of older male workers with low levels of education and few sellable skills as they were put under competition with female and foreign casual workers. The number of female workers rose by 5 million between 1985 and 1995, with 3 million of them working part-time. In the mid-1990s, about 38% of the part-timers were in small enterprises (Tokita, 1997). Also, DFI in and foreign aid to developing countries in Asia as well as complex political processes promoted flow of workers from East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and later in the 1990s, from Brazil and Peru (Machimura, 1994; Morita, 1994). The flow of foreign workers, albeit very slow compared to other developed countries, still rose sharply in the latter half of the 1980s.<sup>11</sup> Often under the title of *trainee* or *student*, many of these foreign workers filled casual jobs in manufacturing and services (Kajita, 1994).

The extent of deindustrialization in Japan in the 1980s was much less pronounced than that in the United States in the decade earlier (Bluestone & Harrison, 1982). In Japan, the effect of cross-border capital flight on domestic employment began to draw serious attention rather recently (H. Kobayashi, 2003) as the ratio of overseas production kept rising to reach more than 13% by the end of the 1990s (Keizai sangyôsho, 2002). This is still below 20%, a figure for the United States in 1986. However, during a decade from 1985, DFI is estimated to have eliminated as many as 1 million manufacturing jobs, often as a result of import increases (Rengo soken, 1995). And, as the earlier discussion indicates, the decline of the manufacturing sector had a serious ramification for low-income workers in the secondary labor market, especially for older male workers. To explain increased homelessness among low-income workers however, we need to pay attention to changes not only in their work environment but also in their housing environment. This leads us to an examination of urban redevelopment, another key component of economic globalization. Next, I take the example of Tokyo to show how urban redevelopment unfolded in the 1980s and helped increase homelessness in the 1990s.

## REDEVELOPMENT AND GENTRIFICATION

Tokyo emerged as a global city in the 1980s as it received more and more transnational firms, foreign firms, and headquarters or branches of domestic firms. Between 1975 and 1987, the number of transnationals in Tokyo rose from 20 to 71 (Machimura, 1994); that of foreign firms rose from 554 in 1969 to 2,960 in 1989 (Tsukada, 1991). As mentioned earlier, the number of producer service firms also rose rapidly to support these and other entities. All these firms moreover required advanced information facilities. One significant consequence was growing demand for office space as well as residential space for high-income earners. And in the process of meeting this demand, the city went through urban redevelopment and gentrification. Gentrification is "a process by which low-income housing is converted to middle- and upper-middle-class housing, often via conversion to condominiums or upscale apartment complexes, or to commercial space for businesses serving a middle- and upper-middle-class clientele" (Wright & Lam, 1987, p. 52). In this way, gentrification not only raises rents for low-income housing but also removes some from the housing market altogether, thereby uprooting tenants. Urban redevelopment sets this process in motion.

In Tokyo, the number of large redevelopment projects increased from 22 in 1981-1983 to 33 in 1984-1986.<sup>12</sup> It further rose to 43 in 1987-1989 (Machimura, 1994). As a result, office space grew substantially, especially in the latter half of the decade. Between 1985 and 1990, the total floor space put under construction for office use more than doubled (Machimura, 1994). In absolute terms, office space increased from 2,650,000 to 5,580,000 square meters during the same period (Machimura, 1994). In the latter half of the 1980s, private rental housing that targeted better-off young singles and small families also grew rapidly. In Tokyo and its surrounding prefectures (Saitama, Chiba, and Kanagawa) taken together, 715,000 such units were newly created in 1985, and in 1987, 915,000 others were added (Kodama, 1990). Furthermore, in Tokyo and these prefectures, the number of luxurious condominiums and other expensive housing units built for sale increased from 97,049 in 1985 to 105,464 in 1987 (Kodama, 1990).

The growth of office space and middle- and high-income housing led to higher rents for low-income workers, who usually depend on private rental housing. In Tokyo, between 1978 and 1988, the rent measured by the *tatami* mat (about 6 × 3 feet) increased 54.8% for wooden apartments with private bathrooms and 44.1% for tenement housing with shared toilets (Tsukada, 1991). Not surprisingly, according to a Ministry of Construction survey in 1988, more than 13% of private renters in Tokyo found the ongoing rents "too high to secure sufficient money to buy even the minimum necessities of life" (Tsukada, 1991, p. 152). The expansion of office space and the more expensive housing units also eliminated some low-income rental housing from the housing market. Perhaps most important for present purposes is the disappearance of a number of wooden rental structures, or prototypical housing for low-income singles and

families (Kido, 1990). Between 1983 and 1988, this type of housing decreased by 16,000 units in Tokyo (Tsukada, 1991). The share of wooden rental units in the total housing units in the city also dropped, from 23% to 19%, partly because of upgrading through renovation and partly because of conversion to office or commercial space (Tsukada, 1991).

Importantly, behind the rent hikes was a tremendous hike in land prices in the city of Tokyo. To a large extent, the hike is attributable to the activity of firms. That is, especially in the latter half of the 1980s, firms rigorously invested speculative money capital in land (Itoh, 1990). In Tokyo, firms and other legal entities increased their land ownership more rapidly in the 1980s than in the 1970s (Tsukada, 1991). By 1988, firms and other legal entities owned more than 70% of all land in the central business districts of Chiyoda and Chuo Wards. This invited an astonishing rise in land prices. Between 1985 and 1986, the average price of commercial land rose about 20% while that of residential land rose by 6.4% (Tsukada, 1991). In 1987, the former rose 75% and the latter 50.5% (Tsukada, 1991). Here we see not only that land prices in Tokyo skyrocketed but also how increases in the price of commercial land raised that of residential land.<sup>13</sup>

Just like deindustrialization, the extent of spatial restructuring in Tokyo was much less pronounced than for example in New York City (Sassen, 1991). This may be because Tokyo pursued multiple urban centers (Narita, 1990) or because extraordinarily hikes in land prices absorbed public attention (Narita, 1996). Yet as indicated earlier, urban redevelopment did proceed rapidly in the 1980s. Geographically, gentrification occurred especially in inner-city areas (covering Shinagawa, Ota, Sumida, Arakawa, and Itabashi) that contained “mixed districts” where low-income housing and small factories coexisted (Machimura, 1994). In those mixed districts, high-rise office and residential buildings replaced low-income housing through redevelopment projects. And redevelopment and gentrification, coupled with highly inflated land prices, undermined the capacity of the low-income housing market to sustain low-income workers. In addition, given the high rents, it is not hard to imagine how small firms that offered low-cost accommodations to single employees increasingly found it difficult to do so.

I have so far limited my analysis to what happened in the private sector to render an increasing number of low-income workers vulnerable to homelessness. Yet the government too played a significant role in preparing the rise in homelessness in the 1990s. It facilitated the shift from a manufacturing to a service economy as well as urban redevelopment and gentrification. It further directly contributed to the rise in homelessness by weakening the public assistance (*kôteki fujo*) system—the safety net for the Japanese. Next, I focus on the issue of the government role in promoting economic globalization and generating homelessness.

## THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT

The ways in which the Japanese government has contributed to increased homelessness, directly and indirectly, can be summarized by deregulation and privatization measures that it took during the 1980s. Behind these measures were a large debt and trade frictions. Government debt, which accounted for nearly 40% of GNP in 1980, resulted from expansive fiscal policy adopted in the 1970s (Itoh, 1990). To lessen the debt, the government, in line with Thatcherism and Reaganomics, pursued neoconservative austerity policy in the early 1980s. Notably, it suppressed spending in social security, education, and aid to smaller firms while placing priorities on defense and foreign aid (Shibata, 1998; Y. Shima, 1982). At the same time, the government launched a large-scale administrative reform and privatized government-run firms, including the Japan National Railways and the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation.

Later in the 1980s, the government tried to mitigate trade frictions with other developed countries, especially the United States. Backed by corporate restructuring and the spread of ME automation systems, Japan's trade surplus had amounted to \$46 billion by 1985 (Itoh, 1990). To increase domestic demand and reduce the trade surplus, the government appreciated the yen and took a series of measures to liberalize financial markets (Miyazaki, 1993). The government also kept lowering interest rates and easing money supply (Miyazaki, 1993). Trade surplus and financial deregulation coupled with the stronger yen and the vast amounts of capital made available through the easy money policy drove large firms to DFI and securities investment. As we have already seen, rapid growth in DFI and securities investment substantially contributed to the shift from a manufacturing to a service economy during the 1980s.

To increase domestic demand, the government further promoted urban redevelopment. It did so by lifting redevelopment restrictions (Machimura, 1994), making masses of land available for private use, and prioritizing high- and middle-income housing (Kodama, 1990). At the beginning of the 1980s, the government revised the Urban Redevelopment Act as urged by Keidanren, a major employers' organization, and by large construction firms. The revision eased private firms' participation in redevelopment. Later, the government treated redevelopment as a major national policy and against the previous national development plans that had sought to balance urban and rural populations and functions, emphasized the increasing importance of "world cities" such as Tokyo (Machimura, 1994). In doing so, the government lifted construction and urban planning regulations and sold vast government-owned land to private interests.

At the same time, the government helped high- and middle-income households build or purchase expensive housing by introducing new tax benefits (Tomura, 1990) and generously supplying grants-in-aid to the Housing Loan



Corporation, which used the grants to offer housing loans at below-market interest rates to encourage home ownership (Kodama, 1990). The Housing Loan Corporation also lent money to housing providers to boost the housing industry (Shindo, 1996). The Japanese government seldom committed itself to housing provision; throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the share of housing expenditures in the national budget (general account) stayed below 2% (Kodama, 1990). Yet in the 1970s, public housing (*kôei jûtaku*) topped the list of items under housing expenditures and accounted for more than half of them. In 1987 however, the share of grants-in-aid to the Housing Loan Corporation (31.7%) exceeded that of public housing (29.3%; Kodama, 1990).

As I have already shown, urban redevelopment and gentrification weakened the ability of the private rental housing market to sustain low-income workers. To the extent that the government contributed to these processes, it is responsible for the development. We need to look further however to understand why homelessness has been a phenomenon largely among older single men. In the early 1980s, a significant change occurred for low-income singles and families as the government abolished the Rent Control Order, which had protected their housing security by regulating private rents (Y. Kobayashi & Ohmoto, 1996). Throughout the decade moreover, the government kept excluding middle-aged singles, especially men, from housing programs. In 1980, the government widened the eligibility criteria for public housing to include singles, but that extension applied only to the elderly and middle-aged women (K. Nomura, 1990). The government neglected middle-aged singles again in the latter half of the 1980s when it offered "silver housing" for the elderly. In Tokyo in the early 1990s, this type of housing absorbed a number of elderly singles who faced housing crises (Suzuki, 1996), but no comparable housing program has been provided for middle-aged singles.

One main reason why low-income older single men have been more prone to homelessness than their female counterparts would lie in the government's conception of housing welfare as "relief" for the poor rather than a universal social service (Suzuki, 1996). One result of this narrow conception has been singling out categories of the poor who deserve public protection, such as families, the elderly, the disabled, and albeit to a much lesser extent, single women. In addition, even as part-timers, older women would have a better opportunity to be employed, especially in service industries. Another factor might be a strong gender ideology that severely stigmatizes female homelessness regardless of age. This ideology operates against men too as long as they believe in men's exclusive role as a breadwinner or responsibility to be "independent" (Iizuka, Ikeda, & Uchida, 2000). Relatedly, the visibility of female homelessness would invoke a stronger public reaction than that of male counterpart. Various data and observations indicate that unlike homeless men, homeless women have been given shelter upon request.

Finally, the government's privatization efforts in no way bypassed the social security system. As recommended by the Ad Hoc Commission on Administra-

tive Reform led by Dokô, a former president of Toshiba, the government not only launched a large-scale administrative reform but also substantially cut social spending (Shibata, 1998; Y. Shima, 1982). For present purposes, particularly important is the contraction of the Livelihood Protection system, or Japan's public assistance system, that constitutes the safety net for the people. To reduce public assistance, in 1981, the Welfare Ministry issued Notification No. 123, which guided welfare offices across the country toward strict means and income tests against public assistance applicants (Shôya, 1988). The government then located this policy within a broader welfare restructuring scheme, which broke with the earlier effort to create a welfare state as opposed to welfare society. Accordingly, between 1980 and 1990, the number of public assistance recipients decreased about 30% from 1.43 to 1.02 million (Ito, 2000). By 1993, it further dropped to 0.88 million. For low-income people, the shrinkage of the safety net meant higher possibilities of both losing benefits and not getting them anew.

As from government housing programs, middle-aged single men have largely been excluded from the Livelihood Protection system. Although this system in principle applies to any poor Japanese household without family support to survive, in practice, it has been applied mostly to families with a disabled member(s), the elderly, and to a lesser extent, female-headed families (Soeda, 1988). Single men have often been required to be too sick to work or at least 60 years old to be considered, and therefore, able-bodied middle-aged single men have had difficulty in establishing their case even when they are legally eligible (Bito, Kinoshita, & Nakagawa, 2000). Indeed, low-income middle-aged single men are trapped; even if they are enrolled in a pension plan, they are too young to receive their share; no matter how poor, they are too young or healthy to receive public assistance; and no matter how eager, they are often too old to gain a decent job. As we will see later, the 1980s welfare restructuring had its toll on yoseba men, and there is no reason to believe that it treated nonyoseba single men more favorably. If so, their narrow path to public assistance became even narrower in the 1980s.

In the end, although the government did help stimulate domestic demand in the latter half of the 1980s, it failed to reduce trade surplus because increased demand was not based on improved living conditions of ordinary people but on speculative investment by large firms and the wealthy (Kotani, 1999). Demand of ordinary people did not grow in turn because the government prioritized large firms and the wealthy and because large manufacturers used trade frictions and the stronger yen as justifications for further ME automation, intensification of labor, and flexible specialization (Itoh, 1990). Moreover, the asset-inflated "bubble economy" that emerged in the latter half of the 1980s was hard to recover once it burst in 1989, and a recession began in 1992 because recovery required both elevation of demand and resolution of credit crunch, a product of financial deregulation (Miyazaki, 1993). Hence, the recession lasted long. Between 1991 and 1996, 83,360 firms went bankrupt (Chûshô kigyôchô, 1997). Most, or 99%, of these firms were medium-sized and small firms. The rate of



unemployment rose steadily from 2.1% in 1992 to 5.0% in 2001 (Kôsei rôdôsho, 2002).

Vulnerable to economic downturns and subject to high rents under the condition of shrinking low-income housing as well as safety net, a number of male workers in small manufacturing and service firms were forced into the streets in the 1990s as they lost jobs as a result of firing or bankruptcy. Day laborers in the construction industry joined them on the streets because, as we will see next, they had also been severely affected by the industrial shift, urban redevelopment, and government policy shifts to deregulation and privatization.

### YOSEBA AND THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

The construction industry occupies a significant position in the Japanese economy. It employs 10% of the total workforce, or 6.6 million people, and its investment accounts for 14% of GDP (Kensetsusho, 2000). The industry has several characteristics. First, since the 1970s, it has played a major economic buffer role by employing jobless men through public works projects at the time of economic downturn (Hippô, 1992; Kensetsu seisaku kenkyûjo, 1997; Kimura, 1996). Second, although many firms operate in a subcontracting system as in manufacturing, smaller firms supply labor instead of parts (Hippô, 1992; Kensetsu seisaku kenkyûjo, 1997; Kimura, 1996). Third, most, or 99.9%, of the establishments in the industry are medium or small in size (Chûshô kigyôchô, 1997). Fourth, relatedly, a high proportion of workers work under inferior working conditions. Construction workers are more likely to experience bankruptcy than workers in most other industries, and they work much longer hours than the average worker for below-average wages (Kensetsusho, 2000). Casualties also abound; the industry is responsible for 30% of all industrial deaths and injuries (Kensetsusho, 2000). Finally, the industry employs a number of day laborers, including yoseba men.

As it has been well documented, yoseba men, currently estimated at 80,000 (Gill, 2001), have been particularly prone to homelessness (Eguchi, Nishioka, & Kato, 1979; Gill, 2001; K. Shima, 1999). This is due to low wages, highly unstable employment, lack of housing security, and poor social security. In yoseba, men stand in the street or visit labor exchanges to obtain jobs. Their employment is very unstable because the number of jobs offered in yoseba districts fluctuates widely with the business climate.<sup>14</sup> Their housing status is highly precarious because flophouses in which they usually stay entail no housing right; they lose the housing when unemployed and cashless. Furthermore, yoseba men are subject to inferior social security. Instead of regular public assistance, yoseba men occasionally receive "extra-legal assistance," or emergency relief outside the Livelihood Protection system (Stevens, 1995). Similarly, they are sometimes covered by an inferior employment insurance program called the

white handbook system.<sup>15</sup> Hence, as a group, yoseba men tend to experience homelessness more easily than other low-income workers.

All this uniqueness notwithstanding, one can find in the construction industry and yoseba districts traces of the broader structural changes that occurred in the 1980s in relation to economic globalization. After the profit rate fell in the industry in the 1970s (Hippô, 1992), large firms increased overseas operation. In 3 years between 1980 and 1983, they doubled construction contracting outside Japan (measured in price), and by 1991, it rose to an all-time high of 1,600 billion yen (Kensetsusho, 1998). The growth of foreign contracting was in part based on the expansion of overseas affiliates in manufacturing and services; large firms did the construction work for factories and offices relocated from Japan. In the latter half of the 1980s, it acquired a new character; large firms increasingly diversified their business by stepping into unconventional fields such as construction of hotels and offices and development of resort areas, especially in North America, Europe, and the Pacific region (Kensetsusho, 1998). Large construction firms sought transnationalization to create demand rather than just meet the existing demand (Shimizu kensetsu, 1985).

Domestically, to raise profits, large construction firms, just like their manufacturing counterparts, launched downsizing and labor intensification through separation of inefficient functions, ME automation, and QC movements (Hippô, 1992; Kimura, 1996). They also applied the strategy of business diversification to the domestic market in response to government deregulation and privatization; they entered such fields as finance, real estate, housing, high technology, and urban redevelopment (Hippô, 1992; Kimura, 1996). Not surprisingly, much of the redevelopment in Tokyo in the latter half of the 1980s was borne by large construction firms (Machimura, 1994). Furthermore, large firms actively undertook the more traditional public works projects and throughout the 1980s maintained the largest share of public works contracting (Kensetsu seisaku kenkyûjo, 1997).<sup>16</sup> Consequently, smaller firms and their employees faced growing difficulties in participating in urban redevelopment, providing neighborhood housing, and resorting to public works projects.

Within the changing environment, some smaller firms reinforced their role of adjusting labor supply (Kimura, 1996), and for the convenience of larger firms, created large labor camps to pool young, docile, and cheap labor, including undocumented immigrants (Nakamura, 1999).<sup>17</sup> The growth of labor camps is not well documented, but in the case of Tokyo, some have been located in the surrounding prefectures of Chiba, Saitama, and Kanagawa (Gill, 2001). What is clear is that the growth of labor camps undermined the role of yoseba districts to supply day labor and helped polarize yoseba men. In San'ya for example, relatively young and employable men moved to labor camps or began commuting directly to construction sites or firms without relying on local labor recruiters and labor exchanges (Nakamura, 1998; Yamaguchi, 2001). Left behind were older yoseba men, who, often suffering health problems, could no longer endure hard and dangerous physical labor.

Yoseba districts also experienced a gentrification-like process in the 1980s. In San'ya, flophouse owners began in the 1970s to renovate outdated wooden structures into reinforced concrete buildings, often in business-hotel style (Yamaguchi, 2001). They accelerated such renovation in the 1980s within the context of the bubble economy to attract better-off day laborers and increasingly, customers from outside yoseba (Umezawa, 1995). During the 1980s, about 90 of some 200 flophouses in San'ya were renovated ("San'ya ni shinchiku no nami," 1990). The renovation, often offering single rooms with an air conditioner and a color television set, led to much higher room rates than before (Yamaguchi, 2001). In a year between 1988 and 1989, the average charge per night in a flophouse in San'ya increased 13% (Umezawa, 1995). In addition, some of the untouched flophouses closed their business permanently. In 1991, six bed-type flophouses (with lodgers sharing rooms) disappeared and about 200 day laborers lost their shelter instantly (Umezawa, 1995).

Furthermore, yoseba in no way escaped the national trend toward (or back to) welfare society. In yoseba, the government's welfare restructuring led to restricted provision of both public assistance and employment insurance benefits. In the early 1980s, the welfare offices in Taito and Arakawa, responsible for San'ya laborers, tightened their provision of public assistance to homeless day laborers. As a result, in these two wards, the average monthly number of homeless recipients of public assistance constantly declined in the 1980s—from 3,042 in 1983 to 2,516 in 1992 (Furusato no kai, 1997). Subsequently, in 1988, the Ministry of Labor began to require a residential card to apply for a white handbook, whereas it used to require only proof of temporary dwelling in a flophouse (K. Shima, 1999). This requirement coupled with the subsequent recession led to a sharp drop in the number of handbook holders. Today, only 2,500 out of some several thousand day laborers in San'ya are said to have a handbook (Nakamura, 1999). Although the yoseba men's employment insurance plan has always been inferior to the standard one, the fact that the proportion of homeless among the "insured" in San'ya remained at a low of 6% to 7% in the 1980s (Umezawa, 1995) indicates that this scheme did help keep many day laborers off the streets, at least before the recession.

In yoseba districts, day laborers' structural proneness to homelessness combined with restructuring of the construction industry, internal polarization, a gentrification-like process, and welfare restructuring to raise long-term homelessness among older yoseba men as early as the 1980s. In the early 1990s when a recession hit the economy, many other yoseba men as well as day laborers in labor camps became homeless, the latter because their working conditions and living arrangements did not significantly differ from those among yoseba men (Tamaki & Yamaguchi, 2000). The homeless population expanded rapidly as low-income workers from other industries were thrown out into the streets in the midst of the recession. As this study indicates however, all these individuals were affected by similar broad structural changes beyond their control.

## CONCLUSION

In this article, I traced the origins of recent growth of homelessness in Japan to a few broad structural changes that proceeded in the country in the 1980s. I also showed how changes in the yoseba system can be conceptualized as part of these more general processes. Albeit abundant, literature on homelessness in Japan is mostly written in the Japanese language, and it offers few systematic analyses of the causes of increased homelessness. In this study, I linked a couple of current arguments around the topic with the notion of economic globalization in an effort to present a fuller account of the rise in homelessness.

Studies are available in English that shed light on the recent condition of yoseba districts and/or day laborers who dwell in these areas (e.g., Fowler, 1996; Gill, 2001; Stevens, 1997). These studies have drawn our attention to rising homelessness among yoseba men and suggested, directly or indirectly, that their plight is associated with lack of affiliation with the major institutions of Japanese society, such as the family and the company. Furthermore, these studies have often illuminated how Japan's social security system discriminates against yoseba men. Although yoseba men certainly represent a subset of the poor in contemporary Japan, the present study indicates that problems of disaffiliation and social security have been more widespread. The structural conditions that render yoseba men prone to homelessness—low wages, unstable employment, lack of housing security, and poor social security—do not appear among nonyoseba workers as often as they do among yoseba men, but the absence of one or two of these conditions no longer assures a life off the streets, especially for low-income older single men. This study suggests that a larger segment of the low-income workforce has been subject to simultaneous exclusion from employment, housing, and welfare.

The present study also draws attention to the usefulness of relating increased homelessness to economic globalization phenomena. Definitions and hence magnitudes and compositions of the homeless have differed from country to country, and concerns and emphases in causal analysis have also differed. At the same time however, a number of Western researchers have identified the kinds of structural changes examined in this study, separately or in combination, as the root causes of increased homelessness in Canada, the United States, and European countries (e.g., Blau, 1992; Daly, 1996; Harvey, 1999; Timmer, Eitzen, & Talley, 1994; Wright, 1989; Yeich, 1994). These studies, as well as this one, indicate that looking at homelessness in global perspective allows us to delineate common structural forces that have operated in different parts of the world to generate homelessness. Needless to say, search of common grounds will help us deepen our understanding of the global phenomenon of homelessness.

## NOTES

1. Since their visibility grew, the Japanese government has counted the homeless four times. The figure here is for January-February 2003. The first three results were 16,247 (March 1999), 20,451 (October 1999), and 24,090 (September 2001), respectively (Nihon seifu, 2003). These numbers are not directly comparable because their geographical coverage differs. However, few doubt the upward trend because local records generally support it. As of 2003, homelessness concentrated in the following 10 prefectures: Osaka (7,754), Tokyo (6,361), Aichi (2,121), Kanagawa (1,928), Fukuoka (1,184), Hyogo (947), Saitama (829), Chiba (668), Kyoto (660), and Shizuoka (465).
2. A number of surveys of the homeless have been conducted to find out the "current situation" of the homeless. The largest one has been that of the government, which interviewed more than 2,000 homeless individuals across the country. The characteristics of the homeless described in this article draw on this and several other relatively well-planned surveys in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, and Hiroshima, including two large-scale surveys sponsored by the Tokyo metropolitan and Osaka city governments.
3. Unless otherwise noted, *Tokyo* in this study denotes the Tokyo Metropolis, which consists of 23 wards, the Tama area, and the Islands.
4. The homeless profile differs from the U.S. counterpart; in the United States, families with children represent a significant subgroup of the homeless (Blau, 1992; Wright, 1989). I believe that this difference stems in large part from a broader definition of the homeless adopted in the United States, which includes sheltered people. In the United States, men seem to account for at least 80% of the street homeless (O'Flaherty, 1996; Rossi, 1989), a group who corresponds to the homeless in Japan. In both countries, homeless women tend to be sheltered. The rarity of street homelessness among women in Japan may be attributable to failure to locate them, strong policy support for mothers with children (Ezawa, 2002), a well-organized prostitution industry (Mizuta, 2000), and/or a strong gender norm that keeps women roofed (Iizuka, Ikeda, & Uchida, 2000).
5. In San'ya, the percentage of homeless day laborers seeking emergency relief in the local welfare center began to exceed 50% of all relief seekers in 1985 (Umezawa, 1995). In and around Kamagasaki, the number of homeless men began to increase in the early 1980s and reached 766 on one day in 1987 (K. Shima, 1999).
6. Although this survey also targeted individuals in homeless shelters, this study draws on data collected from homeless people as they are so defined. The results for the shelter and street groups do not significantly differ from each other.
7. Albeit not as comprehensive as the Tokyo survey, at least a couple of surveys support these tendencies in one way or another. One is a 1998 survey in Hiroshima (Hiroshima rojō-seikatsu wo akirakani suru kai, 2002), which reported that when younger, more than half of the respondents worked in manufacturing or services and as regular workers. The other is a 1999 survey in Nagoya (Sasajima mondai wo kangaeru kai, 2000), according to which (a) 28% and 24% of the respondents had worked longest in manufacturing and services, respectively, and 63% as regular workers and (b) 35% of the respondents held regular jobs just before becoming homeless.
8. Following an official statistical definition, medium-sized and small firms here denote firms or establishments with less than 300 workers in manufacturing, less than 100 in wholesale, and less than 50 in retail and certain services.
9. Transnational firms here denote Japanese manufacturers that own at least 5 overseas affiliates and nonmanufacturers that own at least 10 such affiliates, with a controlling share of at least 25% for each.
10. In Ota Ward (Tokyo), which contains one of the best-known industrial districts in Japan, the number of establishments employing four or more workers dropped from about 5,000 in 1985 to 4,000 in 1991, and the number of workers dropped from about 90,000 in 1985 to 70,000 in 1990 (Tokita, 1997). In Hamamatsu City, Nagoya, after it reached a peak in 1986 at 6,400, the number of factories dropped to 4,900 in 1996 and that of workers from 81,000 to 76,000 in the same period (Tokita, 1997). A similar decline began in Higashi-Osaka City in the 1990s.

11. With immigration for work often prohibited by the government, no one knows their exact numbers, but indicators generally support upward trends. For example, in 1985, the number of foreign entries to Japan exceeded that of departures by 30,000, but by 1990, the difference grew to 160,000 (Machimura, 1994). In 1983, the number of foreign workers charged with illegal status was slightly more than 2,000, but by 1990, it rose to 33,000 (Kajita, 1994).

12. Large redevelopment projects here denote those projects that involved a total area of at least 25,000 square meters and a building(s) at least 45 meters high. Each figure expresses the number of projects completed or scheduled for completion in a given period.

13. Even in early 1995 when the land prices hit the bottom, the price of residential land in Tokyo was about 30 times higher than that in New York (Fukuda, 1996).

14. There is a high correlation between business climate, the number of jobs listed in public labor exchange, and the number of flophouse occupants. In general, upon business downturn, the numbers of jobs and flophouse occupants sharply drop. According to Umezawa (1995), the correlation was 0.942 for San'ya between 1965 and 1991.

15. In the handbook system, yoseba men collect a stamp from their employer for each day worked. They receive cash benefits for a limited number of days if they have collected at least 28 stamps in two months. The system is problematic not only because it fails to cover all yoseba men but also because (a) it waives employers outside public labor exchanges, (b) small employers within the system are often unable or unwilling to pay for the stamps, and (c) yoseba men find it hardest to obtain benefits during recessions when they need them most because there are not enough jobs around at such times (Miyashita, 1977).

16. Large firms kept increasing their share of public works contracting so that in 1995, only less than 2% of the total value of annual public works projects was accounted for by independent employers and small firms (with a capital of less than 10 million yen; Kensetsu seisaku kenkyūjo, 1997).

17. According to a 1989 estimate, 47% of male undocumented immigrants worked in construction and 40% in manufacturing (Stalker, 1994).

## REFERENCES

- Ando, K., & Ishikawa, A. (Eds.). (1980). *Nihon-teki keiei no tenki* [A turning point in Japanese-type management]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku.
- Bito, H., Kinoshita, H., & Nakagawa, K. (2000). *Seikatsu hogohō no chōsen* [Challenges of the Livelihood Protection Law]. Kyoto: Takasuga shuppan.
- Blau, J. (1992). *The visible poor: Homelessness in the United States*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Bluestone, B., & Harrison, B. (1982). *Deindustrialization of America*. New York: Basic Books.
- Chūshō kigyō jigyōdan. (Ed.). (1992). *Chūshō kourigyō no hatten dōkō* [Recent developments in small retail business]. Tokyo: Kigyō kyōsai kyōkai.
- Chūshō kigyōchō. (1997). *Chūshō kigyō hakusho* [White paper on medium-sized and small companies]. Tokyo: Finance Ministry.
- Chūshō kigyōchō. (2003). *Chūshō kigyō hakusho* [White paper on medium-sized and small companies]. Tokyo: Finance Ministry.
- Daly, G. (1996). *Homeless: Policies, strategies, and lives on the street*. London: Routledge.
- Eguchi, E., Nishioka, U., & Kato, U. (1979). *San'ya: Shitsugyō no gendai-teki imi* [The contemporary meaning of unemployment]. Tokyo: Miraisha.
- Ezawa, A. (2002). Japan's "new homeless." *Journal of Social Distress and the Homeless*, 11, 279-291.
- Fowler, E. (1996). *San'ya blues*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Fukuda, Y. (1996). Kyojū no hinkon to tochi mondai [Poverty of housing and the land problem]. In K. Hayakawa & K. Yokota (Eds.), *Gendai kyojū 4* (pp. 117-147). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Furusato no kai. (1997). *Kōreisha rojō seikatsu-sha* [Old street dwellers]. Tokyo: Tōhō shōbō.



- Gill, T. (2001). *Men of uncertainty: The social organization of day laborers in contemporary Japan*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Guzewicz, T. D. (2000). *Tokyo's homeless: A city in denial*. New York: Kroshka Books.
- Hagiwara, K. (2001). Rojô seikatsu-sha eto itaru keiro [Pathways to homelessness]. *Shelter-less*, 10, 107-128.
- Harvey, B. (1999). The problem of homelessness: A European perspective. In S. Hutson & D. Chapham (Eds.), *Homelessness: Public policies and private troubles* (pp. 58-73). London: Cassell.
- Hippô, Y. (1992). *Nihon kensetsu rôdô ron* [A theory of Japan's construction labor]. Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobô.
- Hiroshima rojô-seikatsu wo akirakani suru kai. (2002). *Hiroshima-shi no hômuresu II* [The homeless in Hiroshima City]. Hiroshima: Hiroshima Women's University.
- Iizuka, E., Ikeda, S., & Uchida, T. (2000). Homeless women: Naze nihon no nojukusha wa josei ga attôteki ni sukunainoka [Why are there so few homeless women in Japan?]. *Shelter-less*, 8, 71-109.
- Ito, S. (2000). Kôteki fujo no gendai-teki kinô [The contemporary function of public assistance]. In Y. Shôji, H. Sugimura, & M. Fujimura (Eds.), *Hinkon fubyôdô to shakai fukushi* (pp. 149-164). Tokyo: Yuhikaku.
- Itoh, M. (1990). *The world economic crisis and Japanese capitalism*. New York: St. Martin's.
- Iyotani, T. (1993). *Henbôsuru sekai toshi* [Transforming global cities]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku.
- Kajita, T. (1994). *Gaikokujin rôdôsha to nihon* [Foreign workers and Japan]. Tokyo: Nippon hôsô shuppan kyôkai.
- Keizai sangyôsho. (2002). *Tsûshô hakusho* [White paper on trade and industries]. Tokyo: Gyosei.
- Kennett, P., & Iwata, M. (2003). Precariousness in everyday life: Homelessness in Japan. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 27, 62-74.
- Kensetsu seisaku kenkyûjo. (1997). *Kensetsu sangyô no gendai* [The present of the construction industry]. Tokyo: Tôshindô.
- Kensetsusho. (1998). *Kensetsu hakusho* [White paper on construction]. Tokyo: Printing Bureau, Ministry of Finance.
- Kensetsusho. (2000). *Kensetsu hakusho* [White paper on construction]. Tokyo: Printing Bureau, Ministry of Finance.
- Kido, Y. (1990). Jûtaku seisaku hyôka eno saibunpai-teki shiten [A redistributive approach to the evaluation of housing policy]. In Shakai hoshô kenkyûsho (Ed.), *Jûtaku seisaku to shakai hoshô* (pp. 75-106). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Kimura, Y. (1996). *Gendai nihon no kensetsu rôdô mondai* [The problem of construction labor in contemporary Japan]. Tokyo: Gakubunsha.
- Kobayashi, H. (2003). *Sangyô kûdôka no kokufuku* [Overcoming industrial hallowing out]. Tokyo: Chûôkôron shinsha.
- Kobayashi, Y., & Ohmoto, K. (1996). Yachin no genri to seisaku [The principle of rent and policy]. In K. Hayakawa & K. Yokota (Eds.), *Gendai kyôjû 4* (pp. 169-200). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Kodama, T. (1990). Tokyo to Osaka ni okeru jûtaku kensetsu no dôkô to kadai [Housing construction in Tokyo and Osaka: Trends and issues]. In Osaka City University (Ed.), *Sekai no dai-toshi, Tokyo to Osaka* (pp. 117-153). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Kôsei rôdôsho. (2002). *Rôdô keizai hakusho* [White paper on labor economy]. Tokyo: Nihon rôdô kenkyû kikô.
- Kôsei rôdôsho. (2003). *Hômuresu no jittai ni kansuru zenkoku chôsa hôkokusho* [Report of a national survey on the conditions of the homeless]. Tokyo: Health, Labor, and Welfare Ministry.
- Kotani, T. (1999). Nihon 90-nendai fukyô I [The Japanese recession in the 1990s: Part I]. *Chingin to shakai hoshô*, 1254, 4-18.
- Machimura, T. (1994). "Sekai toshi" Tokyo no kôzô tenkan [The structural change of a global city: Urban restructuring in Tokyo]. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Miyashita, T. (1977). *Sanya nikki* [A journal on San'ya]. Tokyo: Ningen no kagakusha.

- Miyazaki Y. (1993). *Fukugô fukyô* [The combined recession]. Tokyo: Chûôkôronsha.
- Mizuta, M. (2000). Homeless women: Josei no tameno sherutâ wo kaisetsu shite [Opening a women's shelter]. *Shelter-less*, 8, 104-107.
- Morita, K. (Ed.). (1994). *Kokusai rôdô idô to gaikokujin rôdôsha* [International labor migration and foreign workers]. Tokyo: Dôbunkan.
- Nakamura, M. (1998). Yoseba to hanba no jûnen [Yoseba and labor camps in the past decade]. *Yoseba*, 11, 168-175.
- Nakamura, M. (1999). Hanba kyojû-gata-sô no kiga chingin [Starvation wages among labor camp workers]. *Shelter-less*, 4, 55-63.
- Nakane, M. (2002). *Yoseba ni kansuru shakaigaku-teki kenkyû* [Sociological study on Yoseba]. Tokyo: Education Ministry.
- Narita, K. (1990). Saitoshika dankai no Tokyo to Osaka [Reurbanization in Tokyo and Osaka]. In Osaka City University (Ed.), *Sekai no dai-toshi, Tokyo to Osaka* (pp. 1-36). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Narita, K. (1996). Toshi kûkan no gurôbarizêshon to kyojû mondai [Globalization of urban space and housing problems]. In H. Suzuki & A. Nakajima (Eds.), *Gendai kyojû 3* (pp. 29-57). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Nomura, K. (1990). Kôreisha, shôgaisha no jûkankyô [Living environment of the elderly and the disabled]. In Shikai hoshô kenkyûsho (Ed.), *Jûtaku seisaku to shikai hoshô* (pp. 233-253). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Nomura, M. (1998). *Koyô fuan* [Employment uncertainties]. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.
- O'Flaherty, B. (1996). *Making room: The economics of homelessness*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Okurasho. (1996). *Kokusai kinyû kyoku nenpô, 1995* [Annual report of the International Finance Bureau, 1995]. Tokyo: Kinyû zaisei jijô kenkyû kai.
- Osaka City University. (2000). *1999-nendo, Nojuku seikatsu-sha kikitōri chōsa hōkoku* [An interim report of the 1999 survey of the homeless]. Osaka, Japan: Osaka City University.
- Rengo soken. (1995). *Sengo 50-nen sangyô, koyô, rôdôshi* [A 50-year postwar history of the industry, employment, and labor]. Tokyo: Nihon rôdô kenkyû kikô.
- Rossi, P. H. (1989). *Down and out in America: The origins of homelessness*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- San'ya ni shinchiku no nami [Waves of new buildings in San'ya]. (1990, June 2). *Asahi Shinbun*, p. 17.
- Sasajima mondai wo kangaeru kai. (2000). 1999 Nagoya nojuku-sha kikitōri chōsa hōkoku [Report of the 1999 survey of the homeless in Nagoya]. *Chingin to shikai hoshô*, 1273, 13-26.
- Sasajima no genjō wo akirakani suru kai. (1995). *Nagoya Sasajima nojuku-sha kikitōri hōkokusho* [Report of a survey of the homeless in Sasajima, Nagoya]. Aichi, Japan: Sasajima no genjō wo akirakani suru kai.
- Sassen, S. (1991). *The global city: New York, London, Tokyo*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sassen, S. (1994). *Cities in a world economy*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Shibata, Y. (1998). *Nihon no shakai hoshô* [Social security of Japan]. Tokyo: Shin'nihon shuppansha.
- Shima, K. (1999). *Gendai nihon no nojuku seikatsu-sha* [The homeless in contemporary Japan]. Tokyo: Gakubunsha.
- Shima, Y. (Ed.). (1982). *Gyōsei kaikaku* [Administrative reform]. Tokyo: Aoki shoten.
- Shimizu kensetsu. (1985). *Kensetsu-gyō no mirai senryaku* [Future strategies in the construction industry]. Tokyo: Nihon nōritsu kyōkai.
- Shimoyama, F. (Ed.). (1980). *Fuantei shūrō to shakai seisaku* [Precarious employment and social policy]. Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō.
- Shindo, M. (1996). *Jûtaku no seiji keizai gaku* [The political economy of housing]. In K. Hayakawa & K. Yokota (Eds.), *Gendai kyojû 4* (pp. 15-29). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.



- Shôya, R. (1988). Airin chiku (Kamagasaki) hiyatoi rôdôsha no kôreika to seikatsu mondai [Aging and livelihood problems among day laborers in the Airin district (Kamagasaki)]. *Journal of Social Problems*, 38, 21-61.
- Soeda, Y. (1988). Seikatsu hogo seido no tenkai [Development of the livelihood assistance system]. In Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo (Ed.), *Tenkanki no fukushi kokka* (pp. 171-247). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Stalker, P. (1994). *The work of strangers: A survey of international labor migration*. Geneva: ILO.
- Stevens, C. S. (1995). Whose *Ettô* is it, anyway? New year's activities in a Yokohama yoseba. *American Asian Review*, 13, 229-253.
- Stevens, C. S. (1997). *On the margins of Japanese society*. London: Routledge.
- Suzuki, A. (1996). Kyojûkûkan to fukushi [Habitat and welfare]. In H. Suzuki & A. Nakajima (Eds.), *Gendai kyojû 3* (pp. 157-176). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Takahashi, Y. (1990). *Kigyô shakai to rôdôsha* [The corporate environment and workers]. Kanagawa, Japan: Rôdôkagaku kenkyûsho.
- Tamaki, M. (2003). Nojukusha no zôdai to nihon shakai no henka [The growth of homelessness and changes in Japanese society]. *Yoseba*, 16, 90-109.
- Tamaki, M., & Yamaguchi, K. (2000). Nojukusha zôdai no haikei to yoseba no henyô [The background of increased homelessness and changes in yoseba]. *Yoseba*, 13, 76-90.
- Timmer, D. A., Eitzen, D. S., & Talley, K. D. (1994). *Paths to homelessness: Extreme poverty and the urban housing crisis*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Tokita, Y. (1997). *Kôzô-teki shitsugyô jidai no nihon shihonshugi* [Japanese capitalism in an era of structural unemployment]. Tokyo: Shin' nihon shuppansha.
- Tokyoto. (1995). *Aratana toshi mondai to taiô no hôkô: "Rojô seikatsu" wo megutte* [A new urban problem and policy direction: The "street life"]. Tokyo: Tokyo Metropolitan Government.
- Tokyoto. (1998). *Keizai rôdô tôkei nenpô* [Annual report of economic and labor statistics]. Tokyo: Tokyo Metropolitan Government.
- Tokyoto. (2000). *Taijigyôsho sâbisugyô no kôdoka eno torikumi ni kansuru jittai chôsa hôkokusho* [Report of research on advanced producer services]. Tokyo: Tokyo Metropolitan Government.
- Tokyoto. (2001). *Tokyo no hômuresu* [The homeless in Tokyo]. Tokyo: Tokyo Metropolitan Government.
- Tomura, A. (1990). Jûkyôhi to shakai hoshô [Housing expenses and social security]. In Shakai hoshô kenkyûsho (Ed.), *Jûtaku seisaku to shakai hoshô* (pp. 153-179). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Toshi seikatsu kenkyû kai. (2000). *Heisei 11-nendo, Rojô seikatsu-sha jittai chôsa* [Survey of street dwellers, 1999]. Kanagawa, Japan: Toshi seikatsu kenkyû kai.
- Tsukada, H. (1991). *2001-nen no Tokyo* [Tokyo in 2001]. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.
- Tsusansho. (1989). *Tsûshô hakusho* [White paper on international trade and industry]. Tokyo: Printing Bureau, Finance Ministry.
- Tsusansho. (1995). *Tsûshô hakusho* [White paper on international trade and industry]. Tokyo: Printing Bureau, Finance Ministry.
- Umezawa, K. (1995). *Hômuresu no genjô to sono jûtaku seisaku no kadai* [The current condition of the homeless and housing policy issues]. Tokyo: Dai'ichi hôki shuppansha.
- Wright, J. D. (1989). *Address unknown: The homeless in America*. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine.
- Wright, J. D., & Lam, J. A. (1987). Homelessness and the low-income housing supply. *Social Policy*, 17, 48-53.
- Yamaguchi, K. (2001). Tokyo, San'ya ni miru hôsetsu to haijo no kôzô [The structure of inclusion and exclusion in San'ya, Tokyo]. *Liberation of Humankind: A Sociological Review*, 15, 26-53.
- Yeich, S. (1994). *The politics of ending homelessness*. New York: University Press of America.

**MIKI HASEGAWA** received a Ph.D. in sociology from Columbia University in 2004. Currently, she is a lecturer at Tokiwa University in Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan, and a collaborator in a Ministry of Education research project on globalization and lower-stratum people in Japan.